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SUMMARY

This dissertation contributes to the definition of an analytical framework for the
study of optimal jurisdictional size for local service delivery. We argue that the standard
economics framework for the analysis of optimal jurisdictional size importantly neglects
individual preferences for political accountability. Our theoretical model shows that once
we take into account such preferences, the optimal jurisdictional size for the provision of
local public goods is smaller than in the standard model. We obtain empirical evidence to
support our hypothesis from a sample of 197 countries. Our results show that, in fact,
demand for political accountability leads to higher jurisdictional fragmentation both in
terms of greater number of jurisdictions and smaller average population per jurisdiction.
In addition, a meta-analysis of the empirical contributions to the study of economies of
scale in the provision of local services shows that the economies of scale expected from
service provision to larger jurisdictional sizes may not be present except for a handful of
local services, and limited to relatively small population sizes. The results of the metaanalysis signal moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of
traditional local services. In light of these results, we argue that forced jurisdictional
consolidation programs across the world justified by perceptions of excessive
jurisdictional fragmentation, or by the expectation of large expenditure savings due to
economies of scale may have been, thus, erroneously designed. From a policy
perspective, multi-layered institutional frameworks for service delivery (including
cooperation and privatization among other options) may allow targeting available
efficiency gains more efficiently than consolidation.
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CHAPTER 1
OPTIMAL JURISDICTIONAL SIZE FOR PUBLIC SERVICE PROVISION:
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE STANDARD THEORY
“…the sizes of national states (or countries) are due to trade-offs between the benefits of
size and the costs of heterogeneity of preferences over public goods and policies provided
by government.” (Alberto Alesina & Spolaore, 2003)

1.1

On the optimal size of local government

Standard economic theory (Oates, 1972) defines the problem of optimal jurisdictional
size in the provision of services as consisting of two main tradeoffs. First, the trade off
existing between the welfare gains expected from smaller governments (better placed to
match expenditure allocation to local preferences) and the economies of scale (or
associated lower average costs) expected from the delivery of services at larger
jurisdictional sizes. On that basis, equilibrium would be reached when the difference
between the marginal welfare gains from more efficient provision and the marginal costs
derived from foregone economies of scale is maximized.
The second critical tradeoff determining optimal jurisdictional size is that between the
closer accountability offered by smaller governments to their citizens and the higher
management, administrative, and information costs associated with multiple jurisdictions
for service delivery. In truth, although Oates (1972) presents this disjunctive as a second
trade off in his discussion, the latter trade off can be taken as a corollary to the first.
1

Management and administration costs can readily be assumed as part of the service
production costs and, similarly, political accountability is a requirement to ensure citizens
preferences are reflected in local public expenditure, increasing overall welfare.
Equilibrium is reached in Oates' (1972) model when the welfare gains associated with
improved tailoring of service provision to citizens’ preferences are maximized relative to
the costs of production.
The analytical framework proposed by Oates for the identification of the optimal
jurisdictional size for local government provision departs from the consideration that the
individual consumer’s surplus is reduced when a collective decision must be taken to
determine the level of public service provided to the jurisdiction. It is most likely that the
level of the public good G provided will be either above or below the level that would
have maximized individual utility thus the loss of consumer surplus incurred 1 . The social
welfare cost of such a collective decision on the level of G would be equal to the sum of
the individual losses of welfare in Oates (1972) model.
Because we believe an individual consumer surplus approach is intuitive and helpful let
us assume, following Baleiras (2001), that the representative individual derives utility
from the consumption of a private good (y) and a pure public good (G) according to the
following quasi-linear utility function
U(yj, G) = yj + u(G)
where yj is the individual’s consumption of the private good, and G is the quantity of
public good produced. If the utility obtained from the consumption of the public good is
1

Presumably for everyone except the median voter.
2

twice continuously differentiable (U’ >0 and U’’<0), then changes to the goods’ prices
are reflected in changes to the individual’s utility. With a quasi-linear utility function, the
change in consumer’s surplus reflects the utility impact of a price variation. The social
welfare change is the result of the summation across all individuals of the changes in
consumer surplus (Baleiras, 2001).
In the case of a single, representative consumer, he would choose to consume the amount
of public good that maximizes U(yj, G). However, when two or more consumers are
considered and the amount of public good provided is the result of a “collective decision”
(i.e. direct democracy, representative political systems, etc.), then there will be a welfare
loss associated to a level of public good provision that may not be optimal to any of the
individuals. For some consumers, the level of G provided will be below their individual
optimal level and for other individuals it will be over their optimal level. Thus, we can
think of the cost curve C representing a “collective agreement” for public service delivery
(see Figure 1). Following Alesina & Spolaore (2003) linear uni-dimensional model, if we
note G*i as the individual’s preferred level of G, we assume that the loss of welfare
derived from the provision of a collective level of G is the same whether G exceeds or is
below G*i by the same amount. If G is below the individual’s preferred level, there is a
missing input in the individual utility function. For levels of G above the preferred
individual level, the increase in tax price decreases the utility of the public good 2 .

This is for instance the case of elderly couples without school-age children. Such
couples have no preferences for public education expenditure (finances traditionally with
property tax revenues in the USA), except to the extent that good schools improve
property values of their districts. Beyond that point, too much public education turns into
a loss of utility.

2

3

Should the decision on the level of public good provision be taken via popular vote (i.e.
direct democracy), then, provided certain assumptions are met, we would expect the
preferences of the median voter to decisive. However, there are other “collective decision
mechanisms” available, such as representative democracy, whereby the incentives and
preferences of political representatives would also come to play, to determine such level
of provision.
On the other hand, the average cost of production of the public good may be reduced as
more individuals share it; this will be so if we assume the good is produced with
economies of scale over a certain range. Such economies of scale may be derived from
declining average fixed production costs over larger production ranges, or from the
efficiency gains obtained from specialization in production that may only be efficient
when output reaches a certain level. Therefore, we would expect the benefits derived
from cost reduction (represented by the curve B in Figure 1) to rise sharply once
additional individuals are added to the pool of beneficiaries, as corresponds to a convex
relaionship. The marginal increase in welfare derived from the addition of a new
individual decreases eventually until it levels off. Above an equilibrium size of N*, the
sum of individual welfare losses from enjoying a G that is above or below individuals’
optimal levels may completely offset the cost-saving advantages from economies of
scale. As Oates puts it, as “group size increases, the influence of any particular individual
on his own level of consumption of the good diminishes (1972; p.41)”.
Thus, the optimal jurisdictional size (in population terms) is defined, in the conventional
Oates’ model as the government size where the difference between the marginal social
benefit obtained from average cost reduction and the increased marginal social cost
4

derived from a level of G that does not match the individuals’ optimal choice is
maximized.

B, C

C

B’

B

N

N* N**

Figure 1. Optimal Jurisdictional Size

The simplicity of the conventional model is appealing. It includes in a uni-dimensional
analysis both the pattern of economies of scale in the benefit curve and the losses in
allocative efficiency derived from the collective determination of the level of public
good. Baleiras (2001) shows this optimal jurisdictional size is Pareto efficient.
An important corollary of Oates’ analysis is that different public goods achieve different
optimal jurisdictional sizes of provision. Thus, a federal (or otherwise decentralized)

5

system of government whereby public goods and services are delivered by different
levels of government would allow maximizing allocative efficiency.
The assumptions behind this model include the need for a constant and immobile
population, zero transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of
the public good provision be efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation). However, the
assumptions of the model can be relaxed to account for these issues.
Should the public good be subject to important externalities, the benefit curve may be
underestimating the social benefits accruing from the good’s provision. This would be the
case, for instance, of a hospital providing services to patients that reside outside its
jurisdiction. Estimating social benefits only on the basis of the population of the
jurisdiction hosting the hospital would underestimate overall impact and “catchment”
area of benefits. In this example, the model would thus suggest that larger jurisdictional
sizes are required in order to internalize the benefits/losses caused by the provision of this
public good and match the jurisdiction with the benefit area to avoid under provision.
This matching between different public goods with different benefit areas is known as
perfect correspondence in Oates (1972) 3 . The analysis of the welfare implications of
“discrepancies between the boundaries of a public good and those of the jurisdiction” are
discussed in Olson (1969), who already points to the need to establish a wide range of
government institution to reach what he calls “fiscal equivalence”. The social benefit

Several different other terms have been used in the literature to denote this process of
matching jurisdictional size to the benefit area of the provision of a public good. Breton
(1965) used “perfect mapping” to conceptualize this issue. Stigler (1957) called it “fiscal
correspondence” in his study of the responsibilities of different levels of government in
the USA.
3
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curve would shift outwards, increasing the optimal population size for provision to N**
(Figure 1 above).
The effect of relaxing the assumption of an immobile population is ambiguous. On the
one hand, mobility may reduce the cost of smaller jurisdictions if consumers are
efficiently sorted among different jurisdictions, but on the other hand, it may subject
public good provision to congestion costs. This would lead to the implementation of tolls
and charges for public good consumption as developed in the economic theory of clubs
by Buchanan (1965). Lastly, the assumption of zero transactions costs for collective
decision making, should it be relaxed in Oates model, may lead to larger jurisdictions and
fewer governments in order to minimize the cost of government and of intergovernmental fiscal relations. The presumption is that transaction costs will be smaller
for larger jurisdictions due to economies of scope that reduce the cost of policy
coordination and public good delivery Boyne (1992). This argument, as we will see, does
not seem to be backed up by empirical evidence in government cost savings after
jurisdictional consolidation (Bish, 2001).
Oates (1972) argues that this analysis should guide policy makers and academics in
answering which level of government should provide the good (i.e. determine the level of
consumption), but that the production function of a particular good may indicate the
desirability of contracting with another local government, a higher government level, or
even privatizing the production of the good. The distinction between allocative and
productive efficiency is thus outlined clearly by Oates. Interestingly, he briefly mentions
that privatization or contracting out to other governments may “permit a different type of
resolution of this trade off problem”. That, for some public goods, joint production or
7

privatization may allow enjoying the benefits of decentralized provision (differing levels
per government) and the cost advantages from economies of scale. Thus, the basic model
does offer important insights as to the efficient institutional set-up that should
accommodate the provision of the public good. However, this option is not fully
developed.
Assuming that the cost function of a generic public good shows increasing returns to
scale, being thus U-shaped although not necessarily symmetrical, a local government
may find itself unable to take advantage of the economies of scale due to reduced size
(i.e. and lack of investment capacity for instance), as in point A in Figure 2.

C

LAC

A
B

Q’

Q

Q*

Figure 2. Long-run U-shaped Average Cost Curve (LAC)
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A larger government size would allow reaching the productive capacity required to move
to B, where the full extent of the economies of scale is taken advantage of. The
investment required to produce the amount of public good required may be prohibitively
high for a small local government, and thus it may find, if it decided to produce the good
by itself, that it would be located at point Q’ in Figure 2.A, a sub-optimal state.

Oates’ model may arguably suggest that a larger jurisdictional size would allow reaching
B and benefiting from the cost savings derived. Perhaps logically, resort to local
governments’ consolidation, anchored in the assumption of available economies of scale,
has dominated jurisdictional reform around the world in search for more efficient local
public sectors. As we have seen, once the main assumptions of the model are relaxed, the
model predicts that lower levels of government fragmentation would be more efficient.
Thus, allowing for externalities from the provision of public goods suggest the need for
larger governments that internalize those effects. Equally, the costs of collective decision
making, if assumed not to be zero, are to be reduced by larger government units that
avoid duplication of functions (i.e. economies of scope).

It may also be the case that not just a single jurisdictional size achieves economies of
scale, but that the latter are available in full extent once a certain benchmark has been
passed, as in Figure 3. In this case, larger jurisdictional size after Q* (Figure 3) does not
provide greater cost savings, but constant average costs. In any case, cost curves such as
the one depicted in Figure 2 or 3 would signal limits in the extent of economies of scale.
Beyond a certain level of production, long term average costs either increase or remain
9

constant. For the purpose of determining an optimal jurisdictional size, it would then
seem that the economies of scale are constrained to certain population limits that are
largely dependent on the available technology.

C

A
LAC

B

Q’

Q

Q*

Figure 3. Alternative shapes of the Long-Term Average Cost Curve

Alternatively, the production function of the service may reflect constant costs of
production independently of the level of production (as in Figure 4 for the flat LAC
curve), and thus the size of the jurisdiction would not affect the unit cost of production.
This is typical of labor-intensive public goods, where there is no need of large capital
investment start-ups.

The observation of local service delivery patterns across countries shows, however, that
resorting to other institutional forms of service production may also allow reaching the
10

optimal production level Q* maintaining a given level of government fragmentation. This
is an important issue that Oates hints at only in passing, but one with considerable
implications for the “real world”, not fully considered in the model. In particular, Oates
(1972) argues that, for some services, it may be possible to retain the benefits from
decentralized provision and produce with economies of scale by resorting to privatization
or service agreements among governments. It would seem, in principle, that the whole
range of local services would be eligible for those arrangements, at least those that
exhibit economies of scale.

C
LAC’

LAC

Q

Figure 4. Alternative shapes of the Long-Term Average Cost Curve
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1.2

A formulation of the standard theoretical model

In the mathematical appendix to his seminal work on fiscal decentralization, Oates (1972)
derives the equilibrium quantity that minimizes the welfare loss incurred from providing
a common level of production (as opposed to that preferred by single individuals) for a
given group of people. His solution is however solely based on the minimization of the
loss of welfare derived from the joint consumption of a level of public good that is likely
not to be equal to each individual’s preferences. This solution does not incorporate the
other element of the trade-off, the benefits derived from the reduction in price from
economies of scale and larger size. In fact, Oates does not model mathematically the
optimal jurisdictional size model, but solves for the optimal level of public good
provision given a certain group size. In this section, we provide a complete formulation
of the trade-off, with the idea of extending this analysis to the possibilities presented by
alternatives institutional forms for service delivery.

For extending the model, we will employ Buchanan's (1965) formulation of a theory of
clubs (which is also the theoretical formulation of Oates’ optimal jurisdictional size
theory), but allowing for heterogeneous individual preferences. Our approach derives a
social welfare function (from the summation of individual utility functions) that in itself
contains the main trade-off between economies of scale and matching heterogeneous
preferences presented by Oates. The optimal size of the group will then be a function of
the public service production costs and of the level of jointly-provided public good and
how the latter varies from each individual’s optimal level. We also delve into Alesina &

12

Spolaore (2003) modeling of optimal jurisdictional size by adopting a uni-dimensional
linear model whereby losses of welfare can be measured as distance between the
individual’s preferred consumption level of G and the level provided as a result of the
collective decision.

As we discussed, we assume in our model a constant and immobile population, zero
transaction costs for collective decision-making and that the financing of the public good
provision be efficiency-neutral (i.e. lump sum taxation).

We assume, as before, that individuals have a quasi-linear utility function of the form:

(1) Ui = yi + Γi (DGi),

where DGi is equal to the difference, in absolute value, between the level of public good
provided and the level that would maximize individual welfare, for each individual.
Following Oates’ original formulation, the sum of the differences between the level of
public good provided and that which would maximize the individuals’ utility is likely to
increase with the size of the jurisdiction (measured in population terms), and thus, in this
initial formulation:

(2) DGi = DG (G(N), G*i)

13

Thus, the larger the difference between the level of public good provided and the
individual’s equilibrium quantity (Gi*, signaling the heterogeneous preferences), the
larger the loss in welfare, and the larger the amount by which overall individual utility
would be reduced. Additionally, such distance to the individual optimum will be a
function of the size of the jurisdiction in population terms N, as the level of G is a
collective decision that will vary with population size. For simplicity, we assume that the
utility decreases in an increasing way from larger distances from the individual’s optimal
level of G, and that equal distances to the individual optimum, be G above or below G*,
translate into identical losses in welfare:

(3) ∂Ui /∂DGi < 0, and

∂2Ui /∂DGi2 > 0

(4) ∂Ui /∂DG1 = ∂Ui /∂DG2 , for each DG1 = Gi*+ξ, and DG2 = Gi*- ξ,

We define t (the tax price paid for the public good) as equal to the average cost of
provision, or total cost (C) of production divided by the size of the population served. In
turn, the total cost is defined as a function of the quantity produced:

(5) t = C/N; where C=C(G)

As the size of the jurisdiction (N) increases, the average cost of provision of the public
good (G) decreases, improving the individual’s welfare level. The individual’s utility

14

from lower taxes (or average production costs), increases however in a decreasing way,
represented by the positive value of the second derivative.

(6) ∂Ui /∂t < 0, and

∂2Ui /∂t2 > 0

This is graphically represented by curve B in our Figure 1 above. The implication of (6)
above is that individual utility increases with the consumption of the private good, in a
decreasing way:

(7) ∂Ui /∂y > 0, and

∂2Ui /∂y2 < 0

An additional member to the jurisdiction adds another person to the collective decisionmaking mechanism for the determination of G. Thus the sum of the distances between
individual preferences of G (Gi*) and the effective level finally provided increases,
decreasing overall utility.

(8) Σ∂Ui /∂N < 0

This is graphically represented in curve C of our Figure 1 above.

The budget restriction of the individual is equal to:

(9) Mi = yi + t

15

which states that the individual’s income (assumed exogenously determined) is spent on
consumption of the private good y and the public good G for which he pays a price equal
to t.

From the individual maximization problem we obtain the individual’s ideal level of
public good provision (Gi*), which is the level of public good that would maximize the
individuals utility given a set of prices. In the following social welfare maximization
problem, such preferred individual level is considered as exogenous.

Lastly, the transformation function for the economy is of the form F(G,y, N)=0 , meaning
that the production cost depends on the quantity produced and on the quantity of private
good required that has to be surrendered for its production. Again to adhere to Oates
initial formulation, we assume that the production cost for the public good presents
economies of scale up to a certain range, after which it exhibits decreasing returns to
scale later, thus giving us a U-shaped cost function. This assumption is later on relaxed
and its implications explored further.

Under this framework, the individual faces the following maximization problem:

(10)

Max [yi + Ui (DGi(G(N), G*i)]
s.t. Mi = yi + t

16

By assuming a quasi-linear utility function, social welfare changes are equal to the
summation of changes in welfare of all the individuals due to variations in t.

Thus, if the government behaves as a benevolent planner, it will try to maximize social
welfare, defined as the sum of all individual utilities (again assuming the quasi-linear
form of the utility functions), solving for the optimal size of the group for service
provision.

Thus we have a social welfare function (SW) of the form:

(11)

SW = ΣUi = Σyi + ΣUi (DGi(G(N), G*i)

The constraint for the entire economy is given by the transformation function:

(12)

F(G, y, N) = 0

On those bases, the optimal jurisdictional size would be reached where the Lagrangean £
below is maximized:

(13)

£ = Σyi + Σ{Ui (DGi(G(N), G*i)} – λF(G, yi, N)

As in Oates (1972), we will assume that the production technology is exogenous, which
will contribute to determine an optimal level of production of the public good. Thus, an

17

increase in the number of individuals sharing the cost increases the individual utility but
at a decreasing rate. This is a realistic assumption in light of empirical evidence limiting
the range of economies of scale to certain production ranges, and this would define the
shape of the benefit curve (B) in Figure 1.

Solving for the optimal group size involves the effects on individual (and social) utility
derived from the differences between individual preferences and group provision (the
larger, the larger welfare losses), and the reduction in costs from economies of scale. As
expected from clubs theory, the optimal size of the group is reached when the marginal
utility of adding an extra member to the group (negative in this case due to its expected
influence on DG) equals the marginal cost (also negative as a cost reduction is expected
from adding yet another taxpayer to the group) of producing the service.

From equation (13) we get the first order conditions:

(14)

∂£ /∂yi = 1 – λ(∂F /∂ yi) = 0

(15)

∂£ /∂G = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DGi)* (∂DGi /∂G) } - λ(∂F /∂G) = 0

(16)

∂£ /∂N = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DGi)* (∂DGi /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)} - λ(∂F /∂N) = 0

Dividing (15) by (14) we obtain:

(17)

Σ (∂Ui /∂DG)*(∂DG/∂G) = (∂F /∂G)/(∂F /∂ yi)

18

The left hand side of this equation represents the change in total welfare derived from a
change in the level of provision of the public good G, which is equal to the marginal rate
of substitution between the public good (G) and the private good (Y), as (∂Ui /∂Y)=1. On
the right hand size of the equation we have the marginal rate of transformation between
the public and the private good. So equivalently:

(18)

ΣMRSiG,y = MRTG,y

which is the well-known Samuelson condition, also reached in Buchanan’s (1965)
analysis of clubs. We can obtain the optimal size of N dividing equation (16) over (14):

(19)

Σ{(∂Ui/∂DGi)*(∂DGi/∂G)*(∂G/∂N)} = (∂F /∂N)/ Σ(∂F /∂ yi)

which is also the well-known membership condition in Buchanan’s (1965) theory of
clubs.

We can therefore re-write (19) as:

(20)

ΣMRSiN,y = MRT N,y

The RHS of (20) is the change in the average cost of provision from adding additional
individual to the population sharing the cost of provision, so we have that

19

(21)

MRT N,y = ∂(C/N)/ ∂N = -C/N2

When we substitute in (20) and solve for N, we obtain:

(22)

N* = √(-C/( ΣMRSiN,y))

Thus the optimal size of the jurisdiction is positively related to the size of the economies
of scale and negatively related to the welfare costs derived from heterogeneous
preferences.

As expected, the optimal jurisdictional size is a function of the production costs and the
economies of scale derived from the production technology and of the proximity of the
level of production of the good to the individual preferences of the citizens. This is also
consistent with Alesina & Spolaore (2003) formulation where optimal jurisdictional size
is inversely related to the marginal cost of distance (a measure of welfare loss from the
difference between G* and individual optimal G levels), and positively related to
economies of scale.

In our formulation, we have assumed a U-shaped long run average cost curve which
determines the shape of our benefit curve B. The graphical analysis presented by Oates in
his Fiscal Federalism assumes such a cost structure. We could however consider the
alternatives to the cost functions discussed earlier in the literature review and the way it
would affect the solution to the model.
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In their study of the size of nations, Alesina & Spolaore (2003) model mathematically the
basic Oates framework for optimal jurisdictional size, using a uni-dimensional model
whereby physical distance between the individual preferences and the effective level of
public good provided denote loss of welfare from collective decision making.

This standard framework has been extended in different directions. Besley & Coate
(2003) show that Oates’ assumption of uniform provision of public good under a
centralized system can be relaxed without altering the main model result: that under
heterogeneous preferences for public goods and no spillovers, a decentralization system
is superior. They also explore the outcomes in terms of public expenditure for different
political economy models of legislative decision making, minimum winning coalition and
cooperative legislatures.

1.3

An Extension: Incorporating Political Accountability

As discussed, the Oates model does not incorporate, in the definition of the optimal
jurisdictional size, the fact that preferences for political representation/accountability may
affect significantly the size of the optimal jurisdiction. The model assumes that in smaller
jurisdictions the level of public good provision will be more closely tailored to citizens’
preferences. This relationship is not however that straight forward, as the capacity to
influence government decision may depend on other variables. Arguably, as population
increases (i.e. jurisdictional size), the relative power of the individual to influence
government decisions (i.e. political accountability) is diluted. Additionally, in the absence
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of a decentralized system of government, local political representatives may simply be
central government appointees. In such a case, local representatives would mostly be
accountable to the central authorities that appointed them, and not to the citizens they
would be meant to serve, regardless of the size of the jurisdiction. Secondly, even if
political representatives are elected locally, they may not enjoy sufficient fiscal autonomy
so as to significantly determine expenditure patterns in their local governments. This is
usually the case when local governments are overly dependent on fiscal transfers from
the central government, very commonly conditional in the nature of expenditure they
should be used on. Thirdly, even when that autonomy exists for local level
representatives, the institutional fabric may not be designed so as to allow for citizens’
preferences to be conveyed regularly to the local authorities. Participatory budgets,
citizens’ score cards, and local assemblies are all institutions that allow consistent
feedback from citizens to their local authorities on their perceptions and preferences
regarding local service delivery.

An approach to modeling the role of political accountability on the optimal provision of
public goods under centralized/decentralized systems of government is that of Seabright
(1996). In his model, political accountability is defined as the probability that the welfare
of any given locality is the decisive factor in the re-election of its government. Obviously,
centralization implies a loss of political accountability in that regard. Seabright’s results
apply even in the case of homogeneous preferences by local citizens. His model uses
localities’ welfare (and not individuals’) as the unit of analysis, disregarding the
technology through which individual preferences are translated into localities’ welfare.
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Importantly, Seabright’s model, although it considers public good provision across three
different levels of government (national, regional and local), it assumes away the
possibility of economies of scope in government action.

In an interesting contribution, Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999), using a common
agency principal-agent model also attempt to capture the implications of a preference for
citizen’s control of the government in the decision to opt over more centralized versus
decentralized structures of government.

Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999) provide a

good discussion of the channels through which smaller jurisdictional size may assist
improved political accountability. Those include 1) by having a smaller number of voters,
there is a higher individual power to affect final output; 2) higher accountability of local
officials due to their physical proximity to the citizens (Ostrom, Schroeder, & Wynne,
1993); and 3) the capacity to compare government’s performance across a range of local
authorities (yardstick competition). Their model however assumes each individual
(principal) signs a separate contract with the government (agent) as opposed to the social
contract that is traditional enforced by voting under either direct or representative
democracy. In addition, the choice of level of government is conducted at the start of the
process, and as such is independent initially of the welfare results.

We approach this issue with a simple extension of the basic model described above that
includes a new variable, political accountability (P), affecting the way preferences are
reflected into a government’s level of provision of the public good G. It is expected that a
higher level of political accountability (assumed to be costless) is preferred by citizens, as
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a signal that their preferences will be more likely incorporated into public policy (and
budgetary decisions). The greater the size of the jurisdiction (N), the lower the political
accountability, that is, the lower would be the capacity of citizens to affect the level of
public good provided.
Therefore, with the inclusion of P:

(23)

DG = DG(G(N), G*i), P), whereby

(24)

(∂DG /∂P) < 0

Thus it is expected that a higher level of political accountability would result in an overall
lower sum of the distances between individual preferences and the level of provision of
the public good.

So our new representative individual’s utility function would be:

(25)

Ui = yi + Ui (DG(G(N), G*i), P), and as described:

(26)

P=P(N,D,FA,CP)

Where D represents the existence of a decentralized government with locally elected
representatives, FA reflects the degree of fiscal autonomy, and CP is a measure of citizen
representation in government decision-making (i.e. such as the existence of participatory
budgeting systems, etc.).
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An increase in jurisdictional size is related to lower individual capacity to influence the
decisions of the politicians, thus reducing political accountability as defined in our model.
(27)

(∂P /∂N)<0

In this case, the individual faces the constraint:

(28)

Max yi + Ui [DG(G(N), G*i), P(N)]
s.t. Mi = yi + t

Where ∂Ui /∂P > 0 , ∂2Ui /∂P2 < 0, that is, an increase in political accountability if
positively valued by the citizens up to a point where diseconomies of representation (in
the form of perhaps red-tape, bureaucracy, etc.) offset gains from additional political
accountability.

Similarly, the maximization problem faced by the benevolent planner of the jurisdiction
is:

(29)

Max £ = Y + ΣUi [DG(G(N), G*i), P(N)) – λ(F(G,Y,N)]

From where we obtain the first order conditions:
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(30)

∂£ /∂Y = 1 – λ(∂F /∂Y) = 0

(31)

∂£ /∂G = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)} - λ(∂F /∂G) = 0

(32)

∂£ /∂N = Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)+ (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)} –
λ(∂F /∂N) = 0

Thus, in equilibrium:

(33)

Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)} = (∂F /∂G)/(∂F /∂Y)

From where we obtain identical Samuelson condition: ΣMRSi G,Y = MRTi G,Y

How will the inclusion of our political accountability variable affect optimal size? As in
the basic model, we divide (32) by (30), substitute λ= 1/(∂F /∂Y) and re-arrange terms:

(34)

Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N)+ (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)} =
(∂F /∂N)/ (∂F /∂Y)

Or equivalently:

(35)

ΣMRSiPN,y = MRT N,y

where the superscript P denotes the marginal rate of substitution once political
accountability is included in the individual utility function.
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By definition, as (∂Ui /∂P)>0 and (∂P /∂N)<0, then (∂Ui /∂P)* (∂P /∂N)<0

As Σ{(∂Ui /∂DG)* (∂DG /∂G)* (∂G /∂N) is, by definition, negative (loss in social welfare
from the addition of one more member to the jurisdiction), with the addition of (∂Ui
/∂P)* (∂P /∂N) we conclude that

(36)

/ΣMRSiPN,y/ > /ΣMRSiN,y/

The absolute value of the loss in social welfare from one additional member to the
jurisdiction is greater once we include a preference for political accountability in the
individual’s welfare function. Not only does utility decrease due to the addition of a new
consumer’s welfare loss in the form of G-G*i , but now citizens also lose individual
capacity to influence the decision over G.

Solving for N, we obtain:

(37)

NP* = √(-C/ ΣMRSiPN,y)

Which leads us to conclude that Np* < N*, that is, the optimal jurisdictional size for the
provision of the public good is smaller once we introduce preferences for political
accountability in the individual’s utility function.
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The size of the jurisdiction (N) affects welfare in a two-fold way. It does so first, by
increasing the welfare costs of agreeing on a common level of provision G (greater
ΣDGi). The larger the group size, the larger the summation, for all citizens, of the
distance between an individual’s preferred level and the level of good finally provided.
This effect is independent of the political system in place. Even with a direct democracy
system, where the level provided is that preferred by the median voter’s, the larger the
size of the group, the larger will be the loss of welfare from that decision. Secondly, the
larger the jurisdictional size, the larger the distance between the citizens and their
representatives. Political accountability is reduced, and with it, the capacity to influence
the level of provision of the good.

1.4

Accounting for different government levels

As discussed, one of the least explored dimensions of jurisdictional fragmentation is the
vertical structure of government, that is, the varying number of levels of government we
observe in countries around the world. Oates (1972) decentralization theorem offered a
guide for the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to different government levels,
but takes the vertical structure of government as given and exogenous to the model.

The determination of the efficient number of levels of government is still largely an
unresolved issue which we explore in this dissertation. Logically, the applied policy
analysis of the vertical structure of government has taken it as given due to the high
political and financial cost of consolidating or creating a new level of government. The
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analysis of social welfare in the provision of public goods by Seabright (1996) compares
the outcomes of provision by central, regional and municipal levels of government, but
does not discusses the efficiency in the creation of a new level of government.

We approach this issue by describing a normative, first best model where we assume an
economy with three types of public goods i =1, 2 and 3. For simplicity, we assume public
good number 1 presents the characteristics of a pure public good, that is, is perfectly nonexcludable and non-rival. Public goods 2 and 3 are impure public goods whereby the
externalities from the production of public good 2 are greater than those of 3.

Additionally, we assume that in the original state, only a central and a local level of
government exist. Central government is assigned responsibility over the provision of
public good 1 (e.g. defense), whereas goods 2 and 3 are provided by the local
government. In this framework, under what conditions would the creation of an
intermediate (or regional) level of government be justified?

As discussed, the “trivial” answer to this question is that the regional level of government
may be already defined constitutionally and thus be exogenously determined. In our
model, where a benevolent planner decides the most efficient delivery options for the
public goods, the decision to create an intermediate (or regional) level of government
would be justified by improvements in social welfare.
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Thus, assuming the utility function of the individual is now dependent on the levels of
provision of the three public goods we have:

(38)

Ui = yi + Ui (DG1(G1, G1*i), DG2(G2, G2*i), DG3(G3, G3*i ), P)
s.t. Mi = yi + t

Expression 38 simply expands our utility function as defined in (25) to reflect the
existence of three public goods. Equally, the social welfare function will be equal to

(39)

SW = Σ yi + ΣUi (DG1(G1, G1*i), DG2(G2, G2*i), DG3(G3, G3*i ), P)

which is simply the sum of the individual utilities as in our basic model. In the initial
situation we had assumed that due to its pure public good characteristics, public good 1
was being produced by the central government level, while the delivery of public goods 2
and 3 was assigned to the local government level.

It is straight forward to deduce that a benevolent planner will assign responsibility to a
regional (or intermediate) level of government if, once the administrative and transactions
costs, plus the loss of political accountability incurred from the assignment of the
responsibility over the delivery of a public good to a higher level of government are
accounted for, the efficiency gains from lower average costs from economies of scale
exceed the loss in allocative efficiency from a larger jurisdiction.

30

If we assumed that the public good 2, with greater externalities in its provision, is
provided by a regional level of government instead of the local level of government, the
decision will be justified in efficiency terms if:

(40)

SW2R > SW2L

Or equally, the creation of a regional level of government would be justified if the social
welfare from the provision of public good 2 by a regional government (SW2R), ceteris
paribus, exceeds the social welfare obtained from the original distribution of
responsibilities (SW2L).

Again, that will mean that for the provision of good 2, the efficiency gains derived from
the economies of scale obtained by the regional government overwhelm not only the
efficiency losses derived from a level of provision less tailored to local preferences, but
also those from lower political accountability, and the higher administrative costs derived
from a new level of government. In addition, should economies of scope exist, the
efficiency gains from lower average costs of production would have to make up for the
loss in economies of scope as well.

This simple model may for instance be an accurate description of the composition of
certain regions in Spain. After the implementation of the organic law on the organization
of regional governments, regions where created by the provinces in a voluntary way. For
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the so called “historical” regions of Spain, such as Catalonia and Galicia, the decision of
which provinces would create the region was clear and justified in historical and cultural
as well as economic and political terms. For other provinces however, the decision to join
a new region was not straight forward. Several alternatives were available for those
provinces, among them the option to become a single-province region.

Provinces evaluated several aspects of the decision to form a region. In the first place,
joining provinces with similar preferences for public good provision was obviously an
important factor in the decision to form a certain region. But also the provincial political
weight in the new regional institutions was an important aspect to consider. Thus,
provinces were more likely to form regions where their political leverage (and thus
accountability to their citizens) was greater. All these aspects are considered in our
simple model.

The obvious extension to this model, not developed in this dissertation, is to account for
the positive aspects of the formation of new levels of government. This would for
example involve developing a sequence for the formation of regional governments where
local authorities evaluate the impact of such an event on their re-election chances among
other things. In any case, our simple model allows us to test in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation some basic hypothesis about the current vertical structure of government
across countries.
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CHAPTER 2
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN LOCAL PUBLIC
SERVICES: A META-ANALYSIS.
“Most researchers conclude that approximately 80 percent of local government activities
do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small municipalities with
populations of 10,000 to 20,000.” (Bish 2001. p.14)

2.1

Introduction

The standard theory of optimal jurisdictional size developed by Oates and extended later
on by other authors (e.g., Alesina & Spolaore (2003)) hinges importantly on the existence
of economies of scale in the provision of local public goods and services. Despite the fact
that many countries have embarked on forced jurisdictional consolidation programs on
the basis of insufficient economies of scale in the delivery of local public services, an
empirical justification for this type of policy remains elusive. Although it would be
unreasonable to expect that local governments’ size match adequately the efficient scale
of production for public services, it could be equally unreasonable to assume, for all
services involved, that larger jurisdictions will necessarily have a more efficient scale.
The ambiguous and sometimes conflicting evidence regarding the existence of economies
of scale in local public service provision demands at this time a systematic quantitative
analysis that summarizes and evaluates the evidence available on this issue. The goal of
this chapter is to produce this quantitative review using a meta-analysis approach.
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2.2

Economies of scale, definition and interpretations

The internationally widespread political drive for less sub-national government
fragmentation is underpinned by the search for economies of scale that are supposed to
reduce the average cost of output, or as Dollery & Crase (2004; p.268) put it, “a decrease
in the cost per person for a given amount of service as population served increases”. A
production process is characterized by economies of scale if, “when all inputs are
increased by a certain factor λ, output increases by a factor larger than that λ” (Panzar &
Willig, 1977). Alternatively, we can also say that economies of scale exist when we can
increase the production of a good or service without increasing productions costs in the
same proportion.

The source of such economies of scale can be varied. They could be derived from the
specialization of the production process (which may only be viable for larger levels of
output); they may originate from increased bargaining power with suppliers once
production increases (leading to lower or discounted prices for inputs); or additionally
they may be related to the spread of fixed costs across larger production levels (thus
reducing average prices).

The most commonly used mathematical formulation of economies of scale is owed to
Baumol, Panzar, & Willig (1988):
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1

Economies of scale (S), or increasing returns to scale (used interchangeably here forth)
exist when S >1, that is, when the marginal cost of production is below the average cost.
Constant or decreasing returns to scale exist when S is equal or less than one respectively.
In elasticity terms, economies of scale exist when the cost elasticity of output (

is

smaller than 1. 4

The literature has predominantly used this definition of economies of scale, although
other contributions have also merited attention. In particular, Caves, Christensen, &
Tretheway (1984), in their analysis of scale economies of local service airlines costs,
include a measure of network length (or points served) for the calculation of economies
of scale. Thus, in their interpretation, short-term economies of scale are defined as:
1

where

is the cost elasticity of output and

is the cost elasticity of network length. As

in Baumol et al, returns to scale exist when RTS >1. In addition, Caves et al. (1984)
argue that the estimation of long-term economies of scale needs to take into account the
quasi-fixed production inputs (Z) and thus:

The definition implies that the cost elasticity of output cannot be zero, as that would
lead to infinite economies of scale, an unreasonable result.

4
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1

where

is the cost elasticity of quasi-fixed production inputs 5 . The empirical literature

on the existence of economies of scale in the production of public services has
concentrated on the estimation of the cost elasticity of output, using a variety of modeling
frameworks. Important contributions to the literature have adopted however the
interpretation of economies of scale proposed by Caves et al. (1984), such as in Mizutani
& Urakami (2001), Aubert & Reynaud (2005) or Filippini & Prioni (2003). A thorough
review of the available empirical evidence yields, as we will see, an inconclusive picture.
This is perhaps to be expected. There does not seem to be, at least a priori, a strong
theoretical case to assume that any local public service will display similar patterns in
terms of economies of scale across the wide range of existing local governments and
technologies available for public service production (Dollery & Crase, 2004).

2.3

“Stylized facts” from the review of the literature

An initial review of the literature unveils a series of “stylized facts” that help shape our
quantitative analysis below. This section benefits from excellent earlier reviews such as
those from Boyne (1995), Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger (2002) in the area of
education, Byrnes J. & Dollery B. (2002) for Australian local governments, or more
recently Bel (2009) for selected sectors.

By quasi-fixed production inputs the authors refer to the fact although in the long-run all
inputs are traditionally assumed to be variable, some of them, including capital and labor
for instance, can be just partially adjustable.
5
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a. Capital vs. Labor-Intensive Services
First, from our theoretical framework, it would be reasonable to assume that economies
of scale are more likely to be found in capital intensive goods or services, where the
investment in capital goods (i.e. fixed costs) can be spread across more units of output
(Dollery & Fleming, 2006). In Chile, Albala-Bertrand & Mamatzakis (2004) find
economies of scale in the provision of transport, sewerage, and power grid services. Bel
(2005) and Alvarez, Caride, & Gonzalez (2003) show that solid waste collection and
processing offers important savings in productions costs derived from larger client
populations in Spain. This is a finding shared equally by Callan & Thomas (2001) in their
study of 110 municipalities in the Massachusetts area, and by McDavid (2000), who
studies cost patterns for 327 local governments of less than 1000 citizens in Canada.

Following Bel (2009), the review of recent work in the analysis of returns to scale in the
operation of airports displays constant returns to scale in relation to airplanes movement
and strong economies of scale in passenger traffic for smaller airports. Efficiency gains
disappear however when the analysis is extended to very large, international airports,
reflective of a traditional U-shape long term average cost curve (Pels, Nijkamp, &
Rietveld (2003); Bazargan & Vasigh (2003)). In the area of urban transport, seemingly
contradictory results are found depending on the sample used for the analysis. For
example, Berechman (1983) finds economies of scale in the operation of buses in Israel
but constant returns to scale are found in the works of Matas & Raymond (1998) for
Spain and Filippini & Prioni (2003) for Switzerland. In addition, increasing although
moderate returns to scale in the Swiss urban transport are found by Farsi, Fetz, &
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Filippini (2007). More conclusive is the evidence obtained from works in the area of
garbage collection, where solid evidence of economies of scale are generally found (Bel,
2009).

A corollary of the above cost theory proposition is that labor intensive local services
should offer less potential for economies of scale. A pioneering reference is the work of
Hirsch (1959) for U.S. municipalities, discarding the existence of economies of scale in
police services. Examining 44 cities and districts of Seattle’s metropolitan area,
Ahlbrandt (1973) does not find economies of scale in the provision of firefighting
services. Similar conclusions are found in the studies of Alt (1971), Boaden (1971) and
Danzinger (1978) in England and Wales. In the United States, Ostrom & Parks (1973),
Dilorenzo (1981) and Gyimah-Brempong (1987) find evidence of higher production costs
in firefighting and police services with the greater population size of the jurisdiction. On
the other hand, Bodkin & Conklin (1971) report declining average costs of production
with higher population size in these two commonly local U.S. services.

However, in the provision of public schooling -- a labor intensive service although one
with potentially higher overhead costs than police of fire services for instance, economies
of scale are found by Chambers (1978), Butler & Monk (1985, for relatively small
districts), Callan & Santerre (1990), Duncombe, Miner, & Ruggiero (1995), Jimenez
(1986), and Reschovsky & Imazeki (1997, 1999)). On the other hand, Gyimah-Brempong
& Gyapong (1991) find decreasing returns to scale in the production of education in
Michigan school districts. A general conclusion of these studies was that such economies
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of scale were extinguished at relatively low levels of enrolment. Duncombe et al. (1995)
show that the consolidation of school districts in the State of New York may have offered
savings in education costs, although the gains were limited to the consolidation of
districts with less than 500 students. A similar study for Iowa by Edelman & Knudsen
(1990) concluded that the gains in terms of economies of scale were found for student
populations between 800 and 900, while in Maine, Deller & Rudnicki (1992) estimated
the optimal size of the education district at around 2000 students.

b. Measurement, measurement, measurement
The mixed evidence for economies of scale gathered from the empirical literature may
well be due to critical differences in the measures of output and production costs used in
the analyses. In their review of previous works on the existence of economies of scale in
Australian local government, Byrnes & Dollery (2002) conclude that, even when
homogeneous goods are analyzed, the evidence as to whether economies of scale exist in
their

production

is

inconclusive.

They

argue

that

inaccurate

measures

of

output/production and costs are partly to blame for the variety of results found in this
branch of the literature. Most of the studies Byrnes & Dollery (2002) review assume
service production is responsive to population and thus use the latter as a proxy for the
former. In addition, they argue, the common use of total expenditure as a measure of cost,
although reasonable, does not solve the problem of allocating administrative costs, which
may be substantial to the operation.
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This general critique to the body of empirical contributions in this area is an old one.
Already Tiebout (1960) criticized Hirsch’s seminal contributions to the literature for his
use of population as a proxy for public service output. Tiebout (1960; p.444) argued
reasonably that “there is no necessary relationship between population and either the
output or quality of the good”. In fact, larger population may lead, Tiebout argues, to
larger per capita expenditures, implying no economies of scale. Studies using population
as a proxy for output levels are rare nowadays, although they represented a substantial
share of early works in this empirical area.

The use of expenditure data instead of cost data for the estimation of cost functions has
also been severely criticized for obvious reasons. Changes in per capita expenditures in a
public service may be due to reasons other than production costs (including
administrative inefficiencies) (Tiebout, 1960; Breton, 1965; Duncombe & Yinger, 2007).
As cost data have been made increasingly available, empirical works have favored their
use and the number of academic contributions using per capita expenditure as a proxy for
average cost has declined over time.

There is substantial evidence in the literature that the size of economies of scale is largely
affected by the measure of output selected, even when the measures refer to the same
service. In their study of cost of bus services provision in Switzerland, Filippini & Prioni
(2003) find larger economies of scale when the output measure is the number of bus stops
as opposed to bus-kilometers. This finding corroborates the results from Berechman &
Giuliano (1984), who find diseconomies of scale in bus operation in the US if bus-miles
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are used as output measure and economies of scale if revenue per passenger is used. Thus
it would seem clear that the existence of economies of scale in the delivery of public
services may be reasonably dependent on the output measure selected.

c. A U-shaped Average Cost Function
A third salient aspect of the initial review of the literature in studies using jurisdictions
(as opposed to production units) as the focus of analysis is the concentration of
economies of scale in smaller (population-wise) jurisdictions. This signals perhaps the
expected U-shape of the long-term average cost curve for public service production. The
seminal Hirsch (1959) study reports evidence of economies of scale in firefighting
services in municipalities of less than 100,000 people and increasing average costs over
that population size. Bodkin & Conklin (1971) find evidence of declining average costs
in police and firefighting services for localities of between 5,000 and 10,000 people.
Additionally Gyimah-Brempong (1987), in his analysis of the Florida case, estimated that
diseconomies of scale in the provision of police services start at population levels of
around 50,000 residents. More recently, Sole-Olle & Bosch (2005) find substantial
economies of scale for provision of local government services in Spanish municipalities
with a population below 5,000 citizens, but growing unit costs of provision until the
population is over or about 50,000. Using a sample of Catalonian municipalities, Bel &
Fagueda (2009) show evidence of substantial economies of scale in solid waste collection
(attained by inter-municipal cooperation in the provision of this service) for
municipalities below 20,000 citizens, but no gains in unit costs for municipalities over
that population. In Sweden, Nelson (1992) shows that savings in the production of local
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services derived from municipal consolidation seem limited to municipalities of very
small population size (below 2,000 citizens after the consolidation). In light of these and
other contributions, Bish (2001; p.14) concludes that “approximately 80 percent of local
government activities do not possess economies of scale beyond relatively small
municipalities with populations of 10,000 to 20,000”.

The review of the empirical evidence also shows different within-country results in terms
of whether economies of scale are present, depending on the sample of jurisdictions and
databases used. This finding is more evident in a third group of studies that analyzes
overall expenditure patterns before and after processes of jurisdictional consolidation or
inter-municipal cooperation. It is perhaps to be expected that once we aggregate all local
expenditure on public goods and services the evidence of economies of scale would be
even more inconclusive. This is due to the fact that, as discussed, we would be
aggregating both capital- and labor-intensive services, with different potential in the
reduction of average production costs due to larger volume.

Thus, in a series of studies in the early 1970s, Davies, Barton, & Williamson (1971), and
Davies & McMillan (1972) report increasing costs of provision (measured as total local
public expenditure, excluding social services) with higher population size in the U.K., a
result also partially confirmed by Mehay (1981). Abelson (1981, in Byrnes & Dollery,
2002) finds that, for 36 Australian municipalities, the average public expenditure per
household does not decrease as population increases. Conversely, the analysis of the
Australian Institute of Public Affairs (1993, in Byrnes & Dollery, 2002) advises of
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possible economies of scale in the consolidation of 210 counties in the province of
Victoria. This report, together with that of the consulting firm KPMG (1998, in Byrnes &
Dollery, 2002), which suggested potential savings of up to 24% in the provision of local
public services for 177 Australian local governments were critical elements in the
consolidation process that took place in Australia during the 1990s (Byrnes & Dollery,
2002).

d. Modeling frameworks for the cost function
The body of empirical literature on the analysis of economies of scale in local service
delivery has seen three somewhat overlapping but otherwise well differentiated stages in
the modeling of production cost functions. Early works in this area used a linear function,
quadratic in the measure of output, to establish the existence of U-shaped cost curves.
Contributions include the early works of Hirsch (1959, 1965), Bodkin & Conklin (1971),
Beaton (1974), Knapp (1982), Kumar (1983), among others. The academic standards of
the early contributions are arguably weaker than those of more recent works. Many of the
articles reviewed from this early stage do not provide descriptive statistics of the
variables used for instance, turning the calculation of elasticity into an impossible feat.
The sample of observations for the meta-analysis suffers therefore from a bias towards
more recent articles.

A second wave of contributions to the analysis of economies of scale in local service
delivery incorporates logarithmic cost functions that allow the direct estimation of cost
elasticity of production. This sub-sample of works assumes a Cobb-Douglas production
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function, a modeling framework that still incorporates important limitations in the
analysis of economies of scale, such as the assumed constant elasticity of substitution of
factors of production and returns to scale, and the homotheticity of the production
function (Gyimah-Brempong, 1987). The largest number of available works has used this
modeling framework, including the seminal contribution from Stevens (1978) in the
sector of refuse collection, Duncombe et al. (1995) in education, or Christoffersen,
Paldam, & Wurtz (2007) in the cleaning of schools in Denmark.

The third and more recent wave of empirical works in this area have favored heavily the
use of the translogarithmic cost functions as a modeling framework. Contrary to the
Cobb-Douglas, the multi-product translog cost function places fewer restrictions on the
parameters (e.g., does not assume constant elasticity of substitution of factors of
production), and allows for the analysis of multi-product production processes that are
common in certain sectors (e.g. primary and secondary education for instance). An early
contribution in the area of bus transport that uses the translog modeling framework is that
of Berechman (1983), but the framework has been recently applied to every possible
service including Drake & Simper (2002) in the area of police, Fabbri & Fraquelli (2000)
in water supply, or Jimenez (1986) in education. The more sophisticated modeling
framework offered by the translog function signals the potentially more accurate and
solid estimates of economies of scale, so any quantitative analysis of the literature must
control for this important development.
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In conclusion, evidence of economies of scale for local public good provision that would
justify Oates' (1972) theoretical argument for larger governmental units can be found but
needs to be adequately contextualized. To the significant empirical limitations related to
the measurement of output and cost of service production, we must add the complications
generated by different (and coexisting) technologies and specificities of geographical
areas. Our initial review of the literature leads us to conclude that economies of scale,
when found, are sector specific, population bound, and perhaps even temporary in their
range and size, depending on the available technologies of production of the particular
time period. Only a small share of locally provided services may offer economies of scale
from larger size jurisdictions.

As a preliminary conclusion, it may be that a more careful examination of the evidence,
in particular the realization of the limited size of economies of scale, may have led to the
promotion and development of alternative institutional solutions to service delivery that
did not involve the forced consolidation of sub-national units of government. But in
addition, as Oates’ trade off suggests, even when economies of scale exist, certain
inefficiencies in costs may have been worth paying for in exchange for larger
improvements in allocative efficiency from smaller size local governments. However,
making these judgments requires a more precise and systematic knowledge of economies
of scale in the production and delivery of public goods. We next turn to how this more
precise information may be produced.
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2.4

Meta-analysis: a systematic, quantitative literature review

As we have seen above, consistent empirical evidence of economies of scale in the
delivery of local public services is somewhat elusive in the literature. The wide variety of
public services studied, the numerous modeling and empirical frameworks employed, and
the long time frame over which the literature in this area spans has complicated reaching
solid conclusions on the patterns of such economies of scale when available. Thus, there
is an obvious need to systematically and quantitatively review this important body of
literature so as to distill its main findings and be able to inform public policy in this area
in a less ambiguous manner. In this section we describe the process proposed for the
development of a meta-analysis of the literature, which we believe goes a long way in
meeting those goals.

The meta-analysis methodology allows combining the results of various studies testing a
particular hypothesis with the ultimate objective of deriving the average “true effect” of
the issue being analyzed, while controlling for the heterogeneity of studies examined.
This statistical method adds value well beyond the simple average survey method, as
each study estimate is weighted by its standard error. The weighted averages thus
obtained from the meta-regression are more powerful and reliable estimates of the effects
being considered than a simple average.

Meta-analysis as a methodology can assist in “summarizing, reviewing and evaluating
empirical research results” (Stanley, 2001; p.131). The use of meta-analysis has become
increasingly widespread in economics and other social sciences, but the methodology has
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been especially popular among medical researchers that required consolidating the results
from empirical tests with few individuals into more powerful statistical analysis (Sutton,
Abrams, Jones, Sheldon, & Song, 2000). Seminal meta-analysis in economics include
those of Jarrell & Stanley (1990) on the Union-Nonunion wage gap, and Card &
Krueger's (1995) on time-series studies of the impact of minimum wage on employment
creation. The methodology has become very popular among economists recently. An
EconLit database search revealed a total of 385 references to meta-analysis between 1985
and 2009, a considerable and multidisciplinary effort, with contributions focusing on
environmental, transport, and labor topics. Although still scarce, increasing use of the
methodology seems to have been made in the area of public finance. 6 The meta-analysis
methodology is especially apt as a way to consolidate results from controlled
experiments. It is perhaps the relatively recent use of lab studies in the area of economics
that has prevented a more extensive use of the methodology. The recent wave of
experimental work in economics, traditionally based in small sample studies, will be
likely to raise interest in meta-analysis in the near future.

In spite of that, the topic at hand seems like a perfect fit for the application of the metaanalysis methodology. The literature spans over several decades, the results in terms of
the existence (or not) of economies of scale in local public service delivery are scattered
and seem to be contingent of many factors (technology, population sizes, sample,
modeling framework, cost function, etc.). Thus, the main objective of our meta-analysis

These include Feld & Heckemeyer's (2009) meta-analysis of FDI and taxation, Bom &
Ligthart's (2009) on the productivity of public capital, or Blackwell's (2007) analysis of
tax compliance experiments, the latter two still being work in progress.

6
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is to conduct a quantitative, systematic review of the empirical literature on the existence
of economies of scale on the provision of local public services to synthesize the existing
empirical evidence to date. In the next paragraphs we follow Stanley's (2001) stages for
the development of our meta-analysis.

a. Identifying all relevant studies and choosing a common metric
The first stage of a meta-analysis is to identify as complete a sample of studies in the area
of interest as possible. We reviewed 103 empirical studies in total from a variety of
sources and journals on economies of scale in local public service delivery, including
several PhD Dissertations and unpublished papers.

The scope of our meta-analysis includes all published or unpublished empirical papers in
the area, published in English or Spanish. Our search included two standard databases
(EconLit and Dissertation abstracts) and the Google Scholar and the Google and Bing
standard search engines, without any time period restriction. We contacted several
authors for unpublished papers, dissertations, and government reports, with mixed
success.

In addition, the bibliographies of all papers reviewed were scanned for

additional studies, applying a “snowball” approach to study identification.

Having obtained 103 papers overall on the topic, the selection of pieces for the metaanalysis used the following criteria. First, we selected for the meta-analysis only papers
that referred to local government provided services. There exist substantial contributions
on the economies of scale of some public services that are not local in nature, such as
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power generation or regional transportation services. The latter were excluded from the
analysis. Second, we eliminated from our pool of papers those which did not use
regression analysis as the main estimation methodology for economies of scale. This may
have biased the sample towards more recent contributions, more prone to use regressions
as opposed to other methodologies, such as simple correlation coefficients.

Third, the review of the literature unveiled a series of studies using the production
function approach to the analysis of local public service provision. None of these studies
can be incorporated into the dataset as they truly do not test for economies of scale, but
for the impact of financing levels on critical performance indicators. In these studies, the
left hand side variable is traditionally a measure of service quality (i.e. average value of
standardized tests in education, etc.), not the production costs. Thus, they offer
complementary but different contributions that cannot be incorporated into our
quantitative review.

Fourth, the selection of our variable of interest introduced additional limitations to the
papers that could be used. The hypothesis we would like to test in this meta-analysis is
that “economies of scale exist in the production of local public services.” Note that we
bundle all local services. It makes sense to include all local services in our study because,
in most countries, jurisdictional consolidation precisely requires the delivery of all
services to a larger population, as opposed to a small or selective set of public services. 7

If special districts exist for the delivery of separate services, as is the case in the U.S.
with school districts etc., then it can make sense to conduct the study for unbundled
7
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Positive testing of the hypothesis would provide support to the consolidation of small
local governments into larger jurisdictional units.

Our theoretical framework and hypothesis defines the cost elasticity of output as the
variable of interest for the study. This statistic allows summarizing the empirical results
of the literature and is therefore used as the dependent variable of the meta-analysis 8 . The
use of the cost elasticity of output as our measure of economies of scale immediately
imposes additional restrictions on our sample of studies. Papers where the statistic is not
reported or from which it cannot be calculated were discarded. As discussed, several of
the early contributions in this area use a linear (and quadratic) cost functional form.
When descriptive statistics are provided, we can calculate the attached elasticity and thus
the paper is added to the dataset. In many cases however such information is not available
and the paper is discarded.

The selection process outlined above left us eventually with 44 studies that reported 60
values of the cost elasticity of output for different services. Of those 60 observations, 44
reported their attached standard errors and 16 did not. The availability of standard errors
is essential as the meta-analysis essentially weights the observations by their variance. In
their absence, other measures of study size can be used (e.g. the inverse of the degrees of
freedom of the study, for instance) but are generally less satisfactory. Our empirical work

services. But in this case the challenge can become the number of observations available
to conduct reliable statistical analysis.
8
Earlier contributions in this literature, using as the dependent variable for the study the
total cost of production (in monetary terms) did not offer a realistic or theoretically sound
alternative for the selection of our statistic of interest.
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will include estimates of the average “true” value of economies of scale for those
observations for which standard errors are reported and for the whole sample of
observations (60) using a different measure of study size. In addition to a greater wealth
of information, this allow for a sensitivity test of our results.

The data set includes studies from 1978 to 2008. As discussed, several studies offer more
than one observation, and we include them all in the dataset. Observations for a total of 8
services and 19 countries are included. As it is traditionally the case with cross sections,
the data set of studies suffers from unobserved heterogeneity, as not all relevant
moderators may have been coded.

As we expected, the inclusion of studies that used translog cost functions also required
calculating the individual statistic where the estimate of economies of scale, as opposed
to the cost elasticity of output, was reported. When the study estimated both the CobbDouglas and translog functional forms of the cost function, the translog estimate of cost
elasticity of output was selected for consistency, unless the Cobb-Douglas estimate was
the preferred estimate of the author.

The alternative use of the (Caves et al., 1984) measure of economies of scale and the
Baumol et al. (1988) measure introduces a certain level of heterogeneity in the value of
the dependent variable. The former, as we discussed earlier, includes in the estimation
economies of scale a measure of network length. As it was not possible to completely
homogenize the statistics from the studies, our meta-regression controls accordingly for
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this fact with a variable (baumol) with value one for the studies using the Baumol et al.
(1988) measure of economies of scale and zero otherwise.

Sample dependency in meta-analysis is a common risk that can manifest itself in a variety
of forms. First, it may be that a large number of observations are obtained from the same
study (and thus the same sample). This may include observations obtained from different
estimation methods over the same sample, or the use of the same sample by many
different researchers.

Fortunately, all of the studies included in our dataset use different samples, which limits
this type of dependency to the greatest possible extent, making our observations fully
independent. In our dataset, we also include the author’s preferred model specification or
estimation in the cases where more than one regression is run on the same sample. It is
the case however that several studies present estimations over different samples. In some
cases, the samples are independent from each other and their inclusion as separate
observations does not present further problems. In other cases, several estimations are
obtained from different sub-sets of the same sample. We also include them as separate
observations, but control in our meta-regression with a dummy variable for studies from
which we obtain more than one data point.

A different type of dependency is that caused by errors in the specifications of the
econometric model that are reproduced in other studies. In our sample, this would
include, for instance, the need to control for the possibility of joint public and private
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provision of the service being analyzed, or the possibility of multi-product functions. We
define moderators in our right hand side of the equation to control for such instances.

b. Meta-regression
As discussed, the studies analyzed differ in many critical dimensions, including the
functional form of the cost equation, the estimation method, and even on the measure of
production. The presence of this vast “between-study heterogeneity” requires the
application of meta-regression techniques that allow for random-effects estimation rather
than the fixed-effect meta-analysis commonly employed for highly homogenous studies.
With a meta-regression we can investigate “the extent to which statistical heterogeneity
between results of multiple studies can be related to one or more characteristics of the
studies” (Hardbord and Higgings 2008; p.493).

In a random-effects meta-regression, the individual study estimates of the variable of
interest (in our case the cost elasticity of output) are assumed to be distributed normally
around a mean effect θ and with a between-study variance τ2 and a standard error of each
study denoted as σi. More specifically, we assume, following Harbord & Higgings (2008)
that:
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Our dependent variable for the meta-analysis is the cost elasticity of output obtained from
the studies reviewed. Regressors or independent variables include the moderators
identified during the process of coding and detailed above. Over this database, we
perform Variance Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression analysis 9 in order to attach
more weight to estimations with lower standard error and thus more accurate. We aim to
estimate the average (true) cost elasticity of output for local public service delivery. The
algorithm used for the estimation calculates first the between study variance (τ2) and later
the β-coefficients using as weights 1/(σ2 + τ2).

The unconditional (average) cost elasticity of output in our sample of 61 observations is
0.7304, that is, if service output increases by a 1 percent, the cost of provision increases
by 0.73 percent, signaling some substantial economies of scale. The results of the metaregression are presented in section 4.5 below.

In our analysis we will assess the potential for publication bias in the sample. As
discussed, we defined publication bias as the higher likelihood that a study is published if
it reports statistically significant results. Thus, following Bom & Ligthart (2009) we
assume that:

9

Using the metareg command of Stata
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where

represents the observed estimates,

is the population parameter and μ is the

sampling error. So if there is publication bias, the insertion of the standard errors in the
meta-regression should yield statistically significant coefficients for that variable. In
Table 1 below we test for the existence of publication bias without the insertion of any
moderator variables yet. Previous studies have assumed publication bias is linear (Card &
Krueger, 1995), whereas others (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2007) argue the relationship
between the estimate and its standard error is more likely to be non-linear and propose a
quadratic approximation. In their study of the output elasticity of public capital, Bom &
Ligthart (2009) present one of the most comprehensive analysis of publication bias to
date, and their analysis is replicated below. In particular, the analysis will allow
identifying the direction of the bias and select the appropriate control for our metaregression including all relevant moderators.

Following Bom & Ligthart (2009), we estimate the equation:

where, as discussed,

represents the observed cost elasticity estimates,

population parameter and μ is the sampling error. The term ∑
moderator variables coded in our meta-analysis, whereas
with value 1 if

(

is the

represents the
are dummy variables

is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. They are interacted with the
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standard errors of the estimates

. The structure of the equation allows us to test for

different versions of publication bias.

If the term ∑

is eliminated, we can test for publication bias in the (assumed)

absence of heterogeneity between studies, as we do in Tables 1 and 2 below. If both the
and

terms are included in the regression as moderators, we

are able to test for bidirectional publication bias. Lastly, if we include solely the standard
error as one term in the regression (that is,

=

= h = 1), we are able to test for

unidirectional publication bias. The superscript h allows us to introduce the non-linear
publication bias test. Thus, if h=1, we test for linear publication bias, but if h=2, we
assume a quadratic, non-linear relation between the estimates and their standard errors.

c. Identifying moderator variables: The coding process and related hypotheses
During the coding process of the empirical papers identified we identified a large number
of aspects that may have determined the overall results found in the previous empirical
literature. Accordingly, dummy variables were created to control for them. A complete
list of variables is provided in Box 1. Not all of the moderators where eventually used in
the regression analysis due to their lack of significance and to ensure adequate degrees of
freedom. Here we discuss the issues with greater theoretical support.

First, our coding process included the creation of a variable for the country in which the
study took place. Almost half of the 60 observations eventually considered for the metaregression where from U.S.-based studies, but the sample also included several European,
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Asian and Latin American countries. The dataset also creates a moderator variable
representing whether the unit of analysis for the study was a production unit (i.e. bus
public company for instance) or a jurisdiction (including studies with municipal, district,
or city focus). A certain overlap is observed however between this variable and the one
that denotes whether cost or expenditure data were used as the dependent variable of the
analysis, perhaps increasing the risk of multi-collinearity if both are included at the same
time.

In terms of the characteristics of the dataset for each of the studies reviewed, we created
dummies denoting where a cross-section, panel, or time series was used. Following
Berechman & Giuliano (1984), cross sectional data renders biased estimates as it assumes
homogeneity of the observations (i.e. jurisdictions, public companies, etc.). The direction
of this bias is not clear however and is a matter left to the empirical analysis. Equally, we
coded the estimation method of the cost function, a variable also closely linked to the
dataset structure.

With regard to the modeling framework of the cost function, we created dummy variables
for studies using linear, log-linear or translog functional forms of the production cost
function. As discussed, the translog modeling framework, which limits the assumptions
imposed on the behavior of the dependent variable, is expected to provide more solid
estimations results although, again, the direction (or sign) of the coefficient is an
empirical question.
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A dummy variable was created to denote, with a value of one, if expenditure (as opposed
to cost) data were used as dependent variable in the analysis; this moderator is expected
to bias downwards the estimates of economies of scale if expenditure data are used. In
addition, we created a dummy variable denoting whether the output variable used
population as a proxy (value 0) or rather a physical measure of output (i.e. gallons of
water, tones of garbage, etc.).

Other moderator variables created during the coding process included a variable denoting
whether the Baumol et al. (1988) or the Caves et al. (1984) definitions of economies of
scale were used in the study. It is to be expected that estimated cost elasticity of output
would be lower with the latter than with the former, as already discussed. In addition, we
created dummies for whether the study controlled for service production alternatives (i.e.
private, public, volunteer services), for cases where the analysis was disaggregated by
population groups, and for cases where more than one observation was obtained from the
same study. Finally, our study size variables included the elasticity’s standard errors and
the degrees of freedom of each study.

Importantly, our sample of studies used a great diversity of data sets, which led us to
conclude there is no data dependency or sample overlap in this particular case. 10 We
believe that all relevant dimensions of the studies could be coded, but as more

For example, an area where there is potential for dataset dependency is that of
comparative fiscal decentralization studies, where the use of the International Monetary
Fund’s Global Financial Statistics is widespread.
10
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observations are made available, the data set should continue to evolve and improve in
the future.

Table 1. Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review
Dimension
Year
Survey

Years
Data
Sector

Country

Unit
Analysis

Variable

Definition

Number
Observations
of 1970s
Value one if survey year from that 18
decade.
1980s
Value one if survey year from that 6
decade.
1990s
Value one if survey year from that 21
decade.
2000s
Value one if survey year from that 15
decade.
of YearsData
Value one if more than one year, 20
zero otherwise.
Education
12
Water
and
17
Sanitation
Garbage
18
Collection
Urban
9
Transportation
Police
2
Cleaning of
1
Schools
Transport
1
Infrastructure
USA
28
Spain
10
UK
3
Netherlands
2
Other
17
countries
of Jurisdictions
Value one if a jurisdictional unit 30
is focus of analysis, zero if a
production unit (municipal firm,
etc.)
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Table 1. Moderator Variables Coded from the Literature Review (Continued)
Estimation
Methodology

OLS

SUR
MLE
2SLS
FE
GLS
GMM
Dataset
Cross
Structure
Section
Panel
Pooled
Time series
Cost function Log linear
form
Linear
Translog
Quadratic
Expenditure
Expenditure
Data
Output Data
Physical
Output
Dummies for Positive
Elasticity
Elasticity
Negative
Elasticity
Production
Production
Method
Method
Definition of Baumol
EOS

27
22
4
3
2
1
1
40
14
4
2
30
2
27
1
Value 1 if expenditure data used for 18
dependent variable, 0 if cost data
Value 1 if a measure of physical 53
output is used, 0 if population used
as a proxy for output.
Value 1 is the cost elasticity 54
observed is > 0
Value 1 if the cost elasticity observed 6
is < 0
Value 1 if the analysis distinguishes 19
between
private
and
public
production methods
Value 1 if Baumol et al (1988) 54
definition of EOS, 0 if Caves et al
(1984)

The model specification also included moderators that should allow us to control for
important econometric considerations. We coded papers by the year of their publication
and the year of the survey. These are potentially important moderator that may absorb
variations in the values of our dependent variable due to changes in productive
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technology. In some sectors, technological advances have been offering greater flexibility
of production (i.e. possibilities for diversification with relatively lower levels for
production) with lower relative fixed capital investment requirements, which may have
reduced somewhat the potential for economies of scale if total costs of production are
considered. From that point of view, earlier analysis may show greater potential for
economies of scale that latter ones.

Secondly, we coded the number of years for which data was available in each study and
the total number of observations. These variables attempt to measure study size and the
robustness of results. Another important control variable that has been coded is the
service that is the focus of the study. As discussed in our theoretical framework, we
would expect to find greater economies of scale in more capital intensive services such as
urban transportation, or water supply and sanitation, where spreading fixed costs among
larger clienteles could lead to lower average costs.
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d. Funnel Plot Analysis
“Funnel plots are a visual tool for investigating publication and other bias in metaanalysis” (Sterne & Harbord, 2004; p.127). Publication bias exists when the probability
of a study being published is higher if it reports statistically significant results (Bom &
Ligthart, 2009). The term funnel plot is drawn from the “inverted funnel” shape that the
scatter plot of the variable of interest and a measure of study size takes in the absence of
publication bias.

In our meta-analysis, each point in the funnel plots presented below depicts a particular
study’s value of the cost elasticity of production in the horizontal axis, and its standard
error (or inverted degrees of freedom when so stated) as the measure of study size in the
vertical axis. If the sample of 60 observations (from 44 studies) considered in this metaanalysis does not display publication bias, we should expect the data points representing
the studies of smaller size (larger standard error) to scatter widely at the bottom of the
funnel, whereas those studies with the smaller standard error (or lower value of the
inverse degrees of freedom) will concentrate at the top around the “true” effect value.

The sample unconditional mean is .735, reflecting some economies of scale in principle,
with a minimum value of cost elasticity of output of -.245 and a maximum of 1.524.
Thus, observations range from large economies of scale to sizable decreasing returns to
scale, as can be seen in Table 1 below.
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Cost Elasticity of Output
All
Education
Garbage
Collection
Water and
Sanitation

Observations
60
12
18

Mean
.735
.447
.905

Std. Dev.
.375
.522
. 178

Min
-.245
-.183
.272

Max
1.524
1.524
1.091

17

.729

.319

-.245

1.086

In Figure 1 below, Chart 1 displays the first funnel plot, where all 44 observations for
which we have standard errors reported are plotted. They include observations for most
of the services considered and all the functional forms of the cost function reviewed. The
plug in routine for Stata-generated funnel plots calculates the fixed effects meta-estimate,
which determines the position of the solid vertical line of the chart. The dependent
variable is the cost elasticity of output and the independent variable the standard error of
the coefficient. This is a weighted average where the weights represent the inverse
variance of the estimate. The discontinuous lines that form the inverted “funnel”
represent the 95% confidence limits around the summary treatment effects. It is important
to underline that the fixed effects estimate obtained from the funnel plots does not include
any of the moderator variables that will be used later on in the meta-regression.

The funnel plot on Chart 1 presents a twin-peak structure that is relatively uncommon in
meta-analysis. A first group of studies with relatively low standard errors concentrate
around a value of 1 for the cost elasticity of output, signaling from limited returns to scale
or slight diseconomies of scale. A second peak is found around the value 0 of cost
elasticity of output, signaling relatively large economies of scale with similarly small
standard errors. This latter group of studies is considerably smaller in number though.
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Only 11 observations out of the 44 for which standard errors are available in our sample
reported a cost elasticity of output below 0.5. In this group, 6 of those observations
corresponded to studies in the education sector, and 8 of them used a log-linear function
to model the cost function.
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Chart 1. All observations with reported standard errors.

Chart 2. All obs. Weighted by Inverse of the degrees of freedom.
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Chart 3. Observations using log-linear functions
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Chart 4. Observations using translog functions
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Figure 5. Funnel Plot Analysis.
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1.5

The remaining 33 observations in the sample with standard errors reported included 17
observations on the garbage sector, 8 in the water supply and sanitation and 3 in the area
of urban transport. The studies’ unit of analysis is mostly jurisdictional units (23), 22 of
them use cross sectional data, 12 assume a translog cost functional form and 13 of them
took place in the USA.

The inclusion in the funnel plot analysis of those observations that do not report standard
errors does not change significantly the results (see Chart 2). In this chart, the measure of
size used is the inverse of the degrees of freedom, a common alternative to the individual
standard errors. The pattern is somewhat less clear, although the two-peak structure is
also identifiable around values of the cost elasticity coefficient of 1 and 0. Neither funnel
plot (Charts 1 and 2) presents the symmetrical distribution that would signal absence of
publication bias. The large heterogeneity among the studies and services analyzed
prevents this. The first two funnel plots, in addition, do not allow us to establish the
direction of the publication bias, and thus additional quantitative analysis will be
undertaken to test for it in the next section.

We can however look more closely at the drivers of the so called “twin peak” distribution
obtained from the general funnel plots. As discussed, it would seem to be partially
determined by the distribution of studies using a log-linear function as the modeling
framework for the estimation of costs. Chart 3 above shows the funnel plot obtained from
the representation of just such studies. The two peaks around the 1 and 0 values of the
cost elasticity of output dependent variable are clearly identifiable.
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This compares with a completely different distribution of studies that use the translog
function as the modeling framework for the estimation of production costs. In Chart 4 we
can observe that those studies report, in general, very low standard errors and, although
the funnel shape that would indicate absence of publication bias is also absent, values of
the cost elasticity coefficient gather in the interval 0.5 to 1.

In terms of the sectoral distribution of observations, it would seem that the results from
studies on the economies of scale of education services may be leading the overall
distribution of observations towards the two-peaked structure observed. Figure 2 below
depicts the funnel plots for the four sectors that contain the largest numbers of
observations, namely education, garbage collection, water supply and sanitation and
urban transportation. These four sector account for 55 out of the 60 observations in the
sample. As we mentioned, a total of six observations from studies on education reported
cost elasticity coefficients lower than 0.5 (Chart 5), while only one observation each for
garbage collection and water supply report such levels of elasticity.
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Chart 5. Observations on the Education sector

Chart 6. Observations on the Garbage Collection sector
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Chart 7. Observations on the Water Supply and Sanitation Chart 8. Observations on the Urban Transportation sector
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Figure 6. Funnel Plot Analysis – Sectoral Distribution.
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Chart 6 above, depicting the funnel plot for observations on the garbage collection sector,
offers the single-peaked, well-behaved funnel plot distribution that presumes absence of
publication bias. Most of the observations are within the 95% confidence interval defined
by the funnel, and the “true” value of the cost elasticity of output in this particular sector
seems to be defined at around 0.9.

The plots for the water supply and urban

transportation sector show also a relatively standard distribution (meaning single peaked,
with most of the observations contained within the 95% confidence interval of the
inverted funnel) of observations.

Thus we can conclude that the double peaked plot obtained in Chart 1 is driven by the
observations from studies in the education sector which yield values of the cost elasticity
of output close to 0, signaling sizable economies of scale. Among those observations, a
log-linear form for the estimation of the cost function was primarily used. This may have
important implications for our meta-regression analysis to which we turn next.

2.5

Meta- regression analysis

a. Testing for Publication Bias
In this section we test for publication bias estimating the equation;
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First, we test for publication bias under the assumption of homogeneity among studies.
Thus, we do not include in our meta-regression any of the moderator variables identified
during the coding process. If the only differences between studies are due to sampling
error (“within study” heterogeneity), then the fixed effects estimation would be the
adequate estimation methodology. If however large “between study” heterogeneity is
expected, then we should consider the use of random effects estimation to account for
both sources of heterogeneity. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 below.
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Table 3. Fixed Effects - Publication bias analysis.
No PB
Cost
Elasticity of
Output
α

.713***
(.121)

Linear PB
Uni-directional
.717***
(.142)
-2.996
(14.94)

αp
αn
R2
N
Q-test of
Heterogeneit
y
(d.f. 43)
I2 –
Variation
due to
“between
study”
heterogeneit
y

Bidirectional
.723***
(.139)

0.762
44
4806.57***

0.762
44

Non Linear PB
Uni-directional
Bidirectional
.715***
.721***
(.125)
(.125)
-17.425
(36.859)

11.071
(16.003)
-118.491***
(31.874)
0.793
44

99.1%
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0.762
44

-3.381
(65.689)
-6129.188**
(2947.902)
0.773
44

Table 4. Random Effects - Publication bias analysis.
No PB
Cost
Elasticity
of Output
α

.696***
(.058)

Uni-directional
.778***
(.103)

Symmetric

-1.157
(1.200)

αp

Uni-directional
.721***
(.069)

Non Linear PB
Bidirectional
.764***
(.053)

-3.469
(4.788)

0.987

0.9913

-.164
(.881)
-10.346***
(1.532)
0.9859

44

44

44

αn
I2
Residual
N
F-test of
symmetry
in PB:
αp = -αn

Linear PB
Bidirectional
.813***
(.071)
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0.9913

-7.943
(16.348)
-658.829***
(145.934)
0.9908

44

44

Symmetric

In Table 2 we present the fixed effects estimates of the model assuming homogeneity
between studies. Our estimate of cost elasticity of output under this assumption is
somewhat smaller than the simple average for all estimates. From the results, it would
seem that the literature may have favored the publication of studies that reported negative
cost elasticity of output, signaling large economies of scale in public good provision. As
we have seen, most of these studies belong to the area of education. The fixed effects
estimates are however compromised by the large amount of between-study heterogeneity
observed from the Q-test 11 . In addition, the I2 test shows that 99.1% of the heterogeneity
found in the sample is due to “between-study” differences.

Due to the large heterogeneity among studies (i.e. several sectors, modeling frameworks,
etc.), random effects estimation is recommended, and results are offered in Table 3. The
estimates reported in Table 3 confirm the nature and the direction of the publication bias,
with studies reporting negative values of cost elasticity of output driving the “true”
average value in our sample.

The estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3 however explain a small amount of the
between study variation (an average of 30%). We therefore turn to the analysis of the
case where we allow for observed heterogeneity between studies with the insertion of
moderator variables in the meta-regression. In line with (Harbord & Higgings, 2008;
p.497) and our earlier results, we do not estimate the fixed effects meta-regression, as

The Q-test is a common measure of heterogeneity used in the literature. It is the sum of
the squared deviations of each study’s effect estimate from the overall effect estimate
(Huedo-Medina, Marin-Martinez, Sanchez-Meca, & Botella, 2006).
11
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such estimation assumes that “all heterogeneity can be explained by the covariates”,
leading to excessive type I errors in cases (as ours) or unobserved heterogeneity. In the
random effects model the weights used in the weighted least squares estimation include
not only the standard errors of each individual observation, but the between study
variance, estimated by the algorithm beforehand.

In the first column of Table 4 we present the random effects estimation of the model with
observed heterogeneity. The first column in Table 4 presents estimates without testing for
publication bias, while the second and third columns include the publication bias test in
its linear and non-linear form respectively. This first set of results offer interesting
insights as to the determinants of the estimations found in the empirical literature of the
cost elasticity of output. The first relevant result is the value of the conditional mean of
the cost elasticity of output. In principle, due to the larger amount of “between-study
heterogeneity” explained under the linear publication bias test (column 2 of Table 4), it
would seem that such estimation presents the better fit for the model. The coefficient on
the constant variable, the conditional mean of the sample, is 1.026, signaling constant
economies of scale for works published in the 2000s, in sectors other than education and
garbage collection, that used predominantly the Cobb-Douglas form approach to the cost
production function, used cost data as opposed to expenditure figures and population as a
proxy for output. The non-linear publication bias test yields a conditional mean of the
cost elasticity of output of 0.829, signaling some economies of scale. The results, using
studies published in the last decade as the reference group, also show large variations in
the value of the conditional mean depending on the inclusion of the publication bias test.
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Once we control for bidirectional publication bias, the estimates of the cost elasticity of
output increase substantially, lowering the extent of economies of scale.

Our time dummies show that, having the 2000s as reference group, estimates of
economies of scale seem to have been greater in the 1980s (a period in which the
sophistication of the analyses increases considerably with the generalization of log linear
function estimations and the first contributions using translog cost functions). This effect
however falls considerably later on the estimates of the cost elasticity of output are
similar in size between the 1990s and the 2000s. Despite the robustness in the sign of this
relationship, the results are not statistically significant. We thus find no solid support for
the hypothesis that modern production methods, enjoying “leaner” technologies and
lower requirements in terms of capital investment, offer lower potential for economies of
scale.
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Table 5. Meta-regression results – Random Effects Estimation
No PB Test

PB Linear
Bidirectional Test

.710***
(.259)

1.026***
(.239)

PB Non-Linear
Bidirectional
Test
.829***
(.250)

1970s

.175
(.122)

.067
(.106)

.123
(.117)

1980s

-.319
(.220)
-.071
(.145)
-.888***
(.223)
.328*
(.166)
.397**
(.151)
.547***
(.148)
-.305**
(.145)
-.197
(.170)
.269*
(.148)

44

-.305
(.186)
-.084
(.124)
-.719***
(.202)
.247*
(.144)
.243*
(.139)
.434***
(.129)
-.285**
(.126)
-.216
(.145)
.170
(.128)
-1.504*
(.831)
-6.16***
(1.598)
44

-.326
(.207)
-.098
(.138)
-.811***
(.216)
.285*
(.157)
.328**
(.145)
.519***
(.140)
-.285**
(.137)
-.206
(.162)
.211
(.142)
-16.6
(14.4)
-285.09**
(127.3)
44

96.74%

96.87

96.87%

60.95%

73.51%

66%

0.056

0.038

0.049

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Constant

1990s
Education
Garbage Collection
Translog
Cost
Function
Expenditure Data
Physical Output
Baumol
Multiple
Observations
αp
αn
Number of
Observations
Residual Variation
due to
Heterogeneity
Proportion of
Between Study
Variance Explained
τ2 (Between study
Variance)
Prob > F
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Our initial hypotheses regarding sectoral distribution of economies of scale are
confronted with opposing empirical evidence. Among the critical sectors analyzed,
education consistently displayed a negative and highly significant coefficient in different
model specifications. Economies of scale seem to be potentially greater in the education
sector despite the presumption that this service displays a more labor intensive production
method and even after other moderator variables are included in the analysis. Studies
analyzing economies of scale in the garbage and collection sector (an assumed capital
intensive sector) displayed lower higher cost elasticities of output, leading to smaller
economies of scale although the results were not statistically significant. Results for the
water and sanitation sector were not found significant either in alternative model
specifications.

Greater sophistication in the modeling of production costs leads to smaller estimates of
economies of scale. The use of the translog function has in the literature, all things equal,
led to higher estimates of cost elasticity of output. Acknowledging that the translog
functions offers substantial advantages in the study of economies of scale, we must
conclude that the use of log linear (Cobb-Douglas based) functional forms for the
estimation of economies of scale may have led to the overestimation of economies of
scale across the board.

The bias introduced in the analysis of economies of scale by the use of inadequate
measures of output is made obvious from the results. The use of expenditure data, as
opposed to cost data, increases substantially the estimates of cost elasticity of output, thus
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reducing the perceived potential of economies of scale. As discussed, the use of
expenditure data as a proxy for production costs introduces distortions in the analysis, as
expenditure data includes administrative items not necessarily related to the production of
services. In addition, the use of physical output instead of population as a proxy for
production proved to be critically important for the results obtained. As expected, more
accurate (physical) measures of output led to larger estimates of economies of scale in the
literature.

Lastly, the meta-regression results showed no impact from the use of different definitions
of economies of scale (i.e. Baumol or Caves), which is a positive sign of the consistency
of our sample and offers some relief as to the possible distortion introduced by the
heterogeneity in the measurement of our dependent variable. The results also show that
studies with multiple observations may tend to report greater estimates of cost elasticity
of output, that is, smaller economies of scale, although the significance of the coefficients
was not robust to different model specifications.

Several other variables were included in earlier model specifications but were found not
significant. Country dummies were consistently found not significant. Their introduction
as moderators in some cases was even pernicious as they could display high correlation
with other moderators (for instance, 9 of the 10 observations from Spain come from
studies in the garbage collection sector, creating multicollinearity between the country
and the sectoral dummy). Individual significance tests also recommended their
elimination from the sample with no loss of explanatory value. Equally non significant
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proved to be the variables identifying the structure of the dataset used in the study (i.e.
cross-sections, panel, etc.), and the estimation method (i.e. OLS, SUR, etc.). Among
other reasons, high correlation was found as expected between the variables measuring
the dataset structure, the estimation methodologies, and the form of the cost function, so
most had to be discarded from the final specification. The results presented in Table 4
were robust to the inclusion of these variables.

It would seem that our results are greatly determined by the studies obtained from the
area of education. From Table 1 we can observe that the mean cost elasticity of output in
the sector of education is the lowest among the three main sectoral groups of
observations. From Chart 5 in Figure 2 above we also notice that most of the observations
reporting negative, or low cost elasticity of output are obtained from studies in the
education sector. Thus, in order to test the robustness of our results to sectoral patterns,
we estimate alternative model specifications excluding alternatively each of the three
sectors for which the largest number of observations is obtained (i.e. education, garbage
collection and water and sanitation). For simplicity, only selected variables are reported.
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Table 6. Sectoral Disaggregation – Random Effects Estimation
(1)
Constant
(1) Garbage
Collection
(2) Education
(3) Water
and
Sanit.
Translog
Cost
Function
Expenditure Data
Physical Output
Baumol
Multiple Observations
Number of
Observations
Residual Variation due
to Heterogeneity
Proportion of Between
Study Variance
Explained
τ2 (Between study
Variance)

Without Education

(2)

.631**
(.256)
.553***
(.182)

Without Water and
Sanitation
.645**
(.246)
-1.171***
(.150)

(3) Without Garbage
-.648
(.448)
.021
(.192)

.468***
(.162)
.383**
(.167)
-.155
(.148)
-.078
(.169)
-.070
(.179)
48

.442***
(.130)
.623***
(.124)
-.389***
(.113)
.095
(.190)
.492***
(.119)
43

.440**
(.189)
.457**
(.224)
.617***
(.202)
-.231
(.203)
.612**
(.227)
42

97.84%

84.15%

89.97%

39.57%

78.29%

58.86%

.048

.033

.073
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As we can see, the significance and robustness of the results obtained in Table 4 do not
seem to be affected by any particular sector. The exclusion of, alternatively, education,
water and sanitation and garbage from the estimations changes substantially the constant
and sectoral coefficients, but other determinants of the results remain significant. The use
of the translog function continues to determine results and leads to lower estimates of
economies of scale, as it is the case with the use of expenditure over cost data. As
expected, variation is wider when the coefficient on physical output area considered as
we alternatively eliminate sectors from the analysis, as the variable is substantially more
correlated with the sectoral studies (i.e. education studies use population as their measure
of output).

In order to provide a more complete picture, our estimation analysis also included
initially the estimation of sector-specific meta-regressions for those sectors with
sufficient observations (garbage and water supply and sanitation). As expected however,
little variation is found among the most critical moderators within a particular sector,
which turns the analysis worthless in our particular context. As our main goal is to
estimate the potential for economies of scale in the case of jurisdictional consolidation,
sector specific results were not critical to our conclusions.

2.6 Conclusions

Jurisdictional consolidation policies across the world have been justified by invoking the
existence of economies of scale in the delivery of local public services that would allow
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reducing average costs of production for larger “client” bases. Our first review of the
empirical literature shows however that evidence of such economies of scale is
inconclusive, with multiple studies reporting constant or decreasing returns to scale in a
variety of services. Our meta-analysis systematizes the wide range of empirical
approaches and modeling frameworks found in this literature and helps identify the study
determinants behind the results found.

At best, the inclusion of studies from several sectors in our analysis seems to confirm the
presence of moderately increasing to constant returns to scale in the provision of local
services. The potential for economies of scale seems to differ greatly at least across three
traditional services, education water and sanitation and garbage, being highest for
education and lowest for garbage collection. The analysis also offers guidelines as to
future empirical endeavors in this area. Physical output and production cost data should
be used, together with translog approximations to the modeling of cost functions.

The estimates of economies of scale selected for our meta-regression are those at the
mean of the sample distribution of each study. As such, our analysis does not offer
insights as to the extent and length of those economies of scale. However, it is unlikely
that, in the context of U-shaped long average cost functions, such economies of scale will
be pervasive well beyond the average production point. From the point of view of
jurisdictional consolidation and assuming a situation of population growth, consolidation
that brings production levels near the lowest long term average cost levels should expect
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the gains from economies of scale to slowly disappear assuming no changes to
production technology in the short term.
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CHAPTER 3.
JURISDICTIONAL FRAGMENTATION AND ITS DETERMINANTS:
A CROSS-SECTIONAL INTERNATIONAL STUDY
“The need for more counties had a pragmatic value in the early days of the
commonwealth. People lived in isolated communities or on farms far removed from the
county seats. (…) Citizen’s naturally wanted to be at least within a day’s ride of their
country seat.” (Commonwealth of Kentucky, 2005)

3.1

Introduction

Considering the limited (and service-specific) evidence on economies of scale on local
service delivery available from the empirical literature, it is surprising to observe how
often programs of jurisdictional consolidation across the world have been justified upon
that assumption. As it was perhaps to be expected, such forced consolidation programs
have yielded mixed results (Dollery & Robotti, 2009). The international experience
seems to show that countries around the world are opting instead for adapting to high
levels of jurisdictional fragmentation while encouraging the creation of new institutional
modes for service delivery (e.g. special districts, inter-municipal cooperation, home
owners associations, etc.).

The observed proliferation of new collective decision making mechanisms for local
service delivery may be an indirect reflection of the limited size and specificity of the
available economies of scale. It may also be symptomatic of the fact that, even when
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economies of scale can be obtained, a preference for political accountability, as discussed
in the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, leads to a smaller (i.e. less than
optimal from an economies of scale perspective) average size of local governments. The
latter concept of political accountability is defined as the voters’ capacity to influence the
election (or re-election) of local representatives, and presumably this capacity is greater
in smaller jurisdictions.
As pointed out, forced consolidation has often failed to live up to the efficiency gains
expected from the start of those policy decisions. Experiences in some countries (e.g.,
Canada) show that total government costs after consolidation may actually have
increased, at least in the short term (Sancton, 2008). Several reasons are behind those
results. For a start, it is difficult to retrench public servants due to labor agreements,
which would lead to duplication of staffing in the new, consolidated jurisdiction.
Secondly, once the municipalities are consolidated, it is generally the case that the
salaries of the public servants are brought up (or equalized) to the higher level observed
pre-merger in the merging municipalities (Deller, 1998), which would further increase
overall labor costs. In any case it would appear that the relationship between
fragmentation and inefficiency is not yet fully established (Dowding & Mergoupis,
2003).
In addition, municipal or regional jurisdictional mergers can face considerable political
opposition and institutional friction, even if one could reasonably expect efficiency gains
from the merger and larger jurisdictional size. This may explain why, for example in
Peru, a 2008 recent law on municipal mergers, which provides large fiscal incentives to
consolidation in the form of grants to the jurisdictions merged over a period of 15 years,
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has not been able to usher a single merger process. In another example, in Spain, a highly
fragmented country with over 8,000 municipal governments, jurisdictional consolidation
has also encountered strong political opposition at the local level, even when no
distinguishable preferences over service delivery are observed among the merging
municipalities or even when good evidence of potential for economies of scale exist
(Bosch & Suarez-Pandiello, 2008).
The cases of Peru, Spain, and perhaps other countries, offer anecdotal evidence that
forces other than the traditional economic theory postulates might be influencing the
determination of the level of jurisdictional fragmentation in a country. To be sure, these
other causes are likely to be complex and likely also to be intertwined, with reasons
ranging from simple political turf and selfishness of local politicians, to more serious
issues of representation and accountability and heterogeneity. Advancing in this
knowledge is the main theme of this chapter and to do so from an international
perspective. To our knowledge, to date, there does not exit a rigorous study analyzing the
cross-country determinants of fragmentation in the way this issue has been previously
analyzed for some particular countries.
Our challenge in this chapter is to search for common determinants of fragmentation
across countries that may help better explain variations in the vertical structure of
government in terms of the numbers of tiers of governments (i.e. the number of subnational level governments in a country) and the number of jurisdictions in each tier (i.e.
total number and also relative to population and area). At the outset, the country fixed
effects of such an analysis are expected to be large and powerful, but not necessarily
overwhelming. In addition to measuring fragmentation using the traditional indicators in
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the literature (i.e. number of governments relative to population and surface), we will
evaluate a dimension of fragmentation that has gone relatively unexplained: the number
of tiers of government in a given country.
The levels of jurisdictional fragmentation around the world, as it is to be expected, vary
widely. In Chart 3.1 below we show the number of sub-national levels of government (in
addition to the central government tier). As it can be observed, 10 countries in our sample
of 197 report having four tiers of sub-national level governments, while 50 report three.
More than 50 percent of the countries in our sample have two sub-national levels of
government, including countries vastly different in terms of population, ethnic
composition, etc.
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Figure 7. Sub-national Government tiers per country.
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4

Equally, the absolute number of sub-national jurisdictions per country ranges widely in
our sample, from a minimum of 0 in Kiribati (only a central level government) to a
maximum of over 240,000 in India (including the Gram panchayat level of government.
The median value is situated at 194. Chart 3.2 offers additional information on the
distribution of the sample in terms of the absolute number of jurisdictions.
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Figure 8. Number of sub-national jurisdictions per country.

A total of 42 countries in our sample report more than one thousand sub-national
jurisdictions including all sub-national tiers of government. A similar number of
countries (51) report less than 50 jurisdictions in total. As it is suggested by the
correlations presented in Table 3.1, the total number of jurisdictions is highly correlated
to the country’s population, not so much with the geographical area. Overall levels of
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income inequality, GDP pc and human development do not seem to be correlated with
the level of jurisdictional fragmentation.

Table 7. Correlations: Number of jurisdictions and selected sample variables.
Number
Jurisdictions
Number of
Jurisdictions
Population
Area
Gini
GDP pc
Human
Development
Index

Gini
Coefficient

Population

Area

GDP pc

0.74
0.25
-0.04
-0.02

1
0.44
0.02
-0.06

1
0.09
0.08

1
-0.48

1

-0.01

-0.03

0.09

-0.41

0.76

HDI

1

1

From our theoretical model we have concluded that Oates' (1972) traditional model of
optimal jurisdictional size would seem to predict larger average jurisdictional size (and
thus lower fragmentation) than our extended model which adds preferences for political
accountability to the utility function of individual residents.

But before we get into the chapter, we must recall that Oates’ model does not predict
government size, but group size (i.e. in a way Oates’ model equates population with
jurisdiction size). In this sense Oates’ model may be misleading when Oates (1972)
identifies groups with local governments (or municipalities), and later on argues that
economies of scale in production can be achieved via other institutional arrangements
(service contracts, cooperation, etc.). Moreover, Oates’ model refers exclusively to the
cost (in efficiency terms) of collective decision making among groups, and it does not
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incorporate the cost of transactions from inter-government coordination or cooperation.
Thus Oates’s model is helpful in that it outlines some of the most important tradeoffs of
the process of assignment of functions across government levels, but it does not explain
the observed level of government fragmentation since it does not deal with governments,
but with groups.

The question we still want to look at is thus: what are the determinants of the current
level of fragmentation observed across countries and how does this level relate to the
predictions of our standard model? The relevance of this analysis lies in the often-cited
inefficient size of local governments, especially in developing countries. But once we
better understand what may be behind the level of fragmentation, would we remain
surprised about the current status quo with the observed local government fragmentation
across so many countries?

The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 we offer a review of the
literature on government fragmentation, while section 3 outlines the empirical models
proposed to approach the analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation. Section 4 presents the
results from our estimations and concluding comments are offered in section 5.
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3.2

A review of the literature on government fragmentation and its
implications

The level of government fragmentation has important implications for an array of issues.
For instance, from a public choice perspective it is argued that more efficient
governments (essentially defined as smaller government budgets) are expected from
increased competition among local governments (Niskanen, 1975; Brennan & Buchanan,
1980). There is some empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis. In particular,
Sjoquist (1982) finds that expenditures per capita in the southern metropolitan regions of
the USA decrease as the number of jurisdictions increases. Pressure to reduce
government spending seemed to be behind recent drives for municipal amalgamation in
Canada as well (Sancton, 2008).
The theoretical foundations for the potential benefits to be derived from sub-national
government fragmentation can be traced back to Tiebout's (1956) seminal proposition
that citizens “vote with their feet” and chose the mix of services and taxes that best
represent their preferences. Assuming adequate supply of local governments (which
assumes away the problem of fragmentation but it implies it), equilibrium is reached
when each citizen maximizes the welfare obtained from the mix of goods and services
provided by the local government, net of tax payments. Thus, a sufficient number of
governments offering distinguishable tax and expenditure packages would be required for
this efficient sorting of individuals. From this point of view, certain level of
fragmentation would be efficiency-enhancing, since a diversity of preferences requires a
diversity of government service packages.
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Empirical evidence on this issue is, again, mixed. Feld, Kirchgässner, & Schaltegger
(2003) find no evidence that fragmentation affects the size (in terms of expenditure
budgets) of Swiss cantons. In fact, earlier contributions of the literature have tended to
suggest that augmenting the number of governments may lead to increases in the overall
size of the public sector. This is likely to occur especially if economies of scale in public
administration are foregone with greater decentralization (Oates, 1991), or if citizens’
control over local bureaucracies translates into a wider range of services being provided
(Zax, 1989). Among other reasons, this “larger public sector” results have been justified
under the assumption of a lower quality of bureaucrats at the local government level,
leading to poorer expenditure management and higher costs for services (Prud'homme,
1995). On the other hand, a recent cross-country study by Martinez-Vazquez & Yao
(2009) argues that the total public sector employment grows with fiscal decentralization,
as increases in employment at the sub-national level more than offset declines at the
central government level.
From an equity point of view, higher fragmentation has been suggested to lead to the
separation of tax bases among rich and poor. Richer areas (such as suburban residential
areas) have a clear incentive to separate from impoverished urban areas that are
subsidized with the revenues collected from their tax bases. The end result of such
motivated fragmentation may be higher inequalities in the provision of services. A highly
fragmented local government level may also lead to more self-centered governments in
term of policy issues; reducing the incentives for coordination among jurisdictions to
maximize overall welfare levels (Lewis, 1998). Earlier contributions seem to show,
however, that higher income voters may be supportive of redistributive programs if they
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expect to obtain long term utility gains (such as overall increases in property values in the
jurisdiction) (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, 1981).
The concept of fragmentation is not easily operationalized. The literature has favored a
measure of the number of local governments relative to the size of the territory (either in
terms of area or population) (Nelson, 1990). However, the range of overlapping
authorities over the same territory (as ultimately, the institutional form chosen to deliver
the public good or service may take several forms) adds an extra complication to the
estimation of local government fragmentation levels. Optimal government size, Ostrom,
Tiebout, & Warren (1999) argued, may depend on the nature of the public good provided
and not just on the preferences of local consumers, leading to “polycentrism”, or a system
of multiple collective decision-making mechanisms. Socio-spatial studies have termed
this process “state rescaling”, a redefinition of the role of government at all levels,
including the involvement of non-governmental agencies in public service delivery, the
allocation of further competencies through decentralization to sub-national levels of
government and the assumption of former national competencies by supra-national
institutions. In line with this argument, Martinez-Vazquez & Timofeev (2008) find that
the trend towards decentralization observed over the last decades has not affected, on
average, the size of government, and offer empirical evidence of significant and positive
relationships between globalization, decentralization and government size.
Whereas there is a shortage of contributions exploring the determinants of the observed
high fragmentation of local government across the world, 12 the literature is rich in

12

In addition, most of them are U.S. based, with some experiences from Canada and
Australia as well.
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contributions exploring the effect of fragmentation on economic growth, urban sprawl
and other topics of economic interest. Nelson & Foster (1999) argue that in the
framework of metropolitan areas in the US, as decision making becomes more
fragmented (more local governments are present), growth in personal income declines.
This is related to the fact that annexation of suburban areas is largely behind the increase
in income growth of metropolitan areas, which are favored by their consolidation with
affluent suburbs. Measures of sprawl used in the literature, very concentrated in the U.S.
experience on the other hand, include population density (as an indication of low-density
development), the percentage of dwellings in single-unit detached houses, or housing
units per square kilometer. In one of the few studies that analyses the plausible reverse
causation between fragmentation and urban sprawl, Razin & Rosentraub (2000) conclude
that residential sprawl impacts positively on fragmentation, but fragmentation does not
have a predictable effect on sprawl. Important results from their analysis include the
confirmation that higher population density is a significant predictor of lower
fragmentation, and that the age of the metropolitan area is a prominent variable predicting
fragmentation 13 .
Empirical analyses of the level of fragmentation of the vertical structure of government
are scarce perhaps due also to the difficulties in operationalizing our variable of interest..

Discussion on the causality for this effect is however insufficient in Razin and
Rosentraub’s analysis. Their age variable measures metropolitan areas that were already
large in 1940, and thus less affected by the impact of the widespread use of automobiles
on urban planning. Denser areas however would be expected to be less fragmented in
light of previous findings; whereas Razin and Rosentraub find that older (and thus denser
in their context) areas are more fragmented.
13
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However, this topic has not gone unattended in the literature. We review below the
available evidence on the determinants of government fragmentation.
a. Do heterogeneous local preferences lead to greater fragmentation?
As discussed in the previous chapter, evidence in support of the economies of scale that
would suggest the need for larger size governments is hard to find. Can we assume that
the other element of the tradeoff proposed by Oates (1972), that efficiency gains are
attained from tailoring local public good provision to local preferences, is granted? If so,
are heterogeneous preferences behind the observed fragmentation of local government?
The measurement of preferences has traditionally been more difficult than the
measurement of costs. However, there have been some successes in the attempt to
operationalize the heterogeneity of preferences in the economic literature. In his seminal
contribution to the study of the determinants of government fragmentation in the U.S.A.,
Nelson (1990) shows that the number of jurisdictions is positively correlated with the
degree of heterogeneity of individual preferences, measured by income dispersion and
age dispersion (i.e. more income and age dispersion leads to a higher number of
governments). This finding is well aligned with the decentralization postulates laid out by
Oates (1972). If the efficiency gains from better tailoring public good provision to
smaller groups make up for the loss of economies of scale, then we would expect higher
levels of group fragmentation (and thus smaller government sizes). Nelson’s analysis
uses all types of governments from the U.S. Census, including both elected governments
and special districts. He finds that the latter empirical relationship is stronger in the case
of special districts than for general purpose governments, and that it may lend support to
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the standard argument that heterogeneity of local preferences leads to smaller
jurisdictions. Contrary to his expectations, greater racial homogeneity (assumed to be a
reflection of lower preference heterogeneity) leads in his analysis to higher
fragmentation, a surprising result.
Stansel (2005) finds a direct relationship between the level of fragmentation and
economic efficiency; he finds a positive relation between the number of local
governments in the US relative to population, and the level of economic growth. To the
extent that local growth is achieved by the attainment of production and allocative
efficiency gains from greater decentralization, more heterogeneous preferences would
lead to preferences for greater government fragmentation. However, the theoretical
linkages between economic growth and the decentralization of expenditure still await
more conclusive empirical evidence (see Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003). These
results would be in line also with Musso (2001) who, using a sample of Californian cities,
finds that more affluent communities (with income as a proxy for diverse preferences) in
fast-growing counties are more likely to form new cities. Conversely, Burns (1994)
argues that changes in the level of access and quality of local services do not explain
local government formation, but instead tax avoidance and racial exclusion are found to
be the most significant determinants. In line with Burns, Martinez-Vazquez, Rider, &
Walker (1997) find that increasing racial heterogeneity of a state population increases the
number of school districts, supposedly in order to satisfy their preference for
disassociation.
A different line of work, important to our analysis, has linked heterogeneity in
preferences to further decentralization. Shelton (2007), using data from a wide sample of
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countries finds that heterogeneity in preferences (measured by an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization) leads to further decentralization, measured as the share of
local government expenditure in total government size. Decentralization is greater,
Shelton shows, in the education and health sector, where one is more likely to find higher
fragmentation of preferences due to social and demographic factors. In any case, greater
decentralization (especially measured as the share of local governments on total public
expenditure) does not necessarily translate into greater fragmentation of local
government.
b. Economies of scope and demands for local accountability
The second major trade-off critical in the definition of the optimal jurisdictional size is
that between administrative costs and local government accountability. 14 If economies of
scope are present, the joint delivery of, for instance, solid waste collection and water
services by a supra-local level of government offers cost savings over their separate
provision by two or more local governments. Evidence of economies of scope exists,
especially for private sector production, but it is scant with reference to local government
production processes. Sharing production inputs was shown to be a source of scope
economies in the health care services sector (Grosskopf, Margaritis, & Valdmanis, 1995;
Dollery & Fleming, 2006). Equally, Callan & Thomas (2001), in their estimation of a
multi-product cost function for municipal waste services, find evidence of significant cost

It is argued that local government production functions present economies of scope,
that is, that the output from the joint production of local public goods or services is
greater than the output obtained with two separate processes, using the same amount of
input (Panzar & Willig, 1977).
14
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savings from the joint provision of recycling and disposal services; whereas Wolff (2004)
argues that substantial economies of scope are found in the integrated management of
River Basin systems in the US, as opposed to functional specialization. Although scarce,
this empirical evidence extends across very different local government services,
providing some ground to expect lower fragmentation of government due to the cost
savings offered by joint production.

Can demand for greater political accountability lead to higher fragmentation? Several
dimensions of the concept of political accountability need to be distinguished. As
discussed in Chapter 1, we may define political accountability as the voter’s capacity to
influence the election (and actions) of their local representatives (Seabright, 1996). Such
ability is expected to affect the political responsiveness to local preferences in the mix of
public goods and services provided. This responsiveness is largely dependent on fiscal
authority aspects such as whether powers to spend and tax have been devolved to subnational governments, and most importantly on whether elections are being held at the
sub-national tiers of government and on the quality of the election systems. Thus, for
heterogeneous preferences to lead to distinguishable mixes of public goods provided
across jurisdictions, certain institutional foundations must be in place linking citizens
with policy makers.

The expected greater responsiveness of representatives from smaller jurisdictions to the
preferences of their constituents is not an aspect explored by Oates in its theory of
optimal jurisdictional size. His model is anchored in a “direct democracy system”,
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whereby local citizens “vote” effectively on the level of public good to be provided. No
political economy issues related to representative democracy are at play thus in Oates’
contribution.

If representative democracy models are the setting for public good provision, then the
principal-agent aspects of the relationship between constituents and representatives come
into play. In this regard, following Tommasi & Weinschelbaum (1999), there may be four
channels through which smaller jurisdictions are able to exert improved control over their
political representatives (and thus ensure their priorities are acted upon). First, in line
with Olson's (1965) theory of collective action, smaller jurisdictions reduce the incentives
to free-riding (which is rendered more visible in smaller groups). Second, the existence of
yardstick competition introduces additional benchmarks for political performance not
easy to manipulate by local representatives. Linked to this aspect, policy diffusion models
(Berry & Berry, 1990) would argue that local experimentation and the diffusion of best
practices across jurisdictions may also introduce incentives and benchmarks for
government performance.

A third channel, most important to us, is the fact that physical proximity to local
representatives allows easier access to them (i.e. reduced transaction costs) even when
demands are not related to policy changes but simply to quick, expedite action on issues
of citizens’ interest. County formation in several of the U.S. States, for instance, has been
particularly determined by this. Historical records from Kentucky and Georgia for
instance would show that county boundaries were drawn ensuring no citizen resided more
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than a day’s ride from the county seat. Considering the strong historical inertia of
jurisdictional formation, constituents’ proximity to local governments may have been the
single most important determinant of jurisdictional fragmentation.

In a game theoretic setting, physical proximity increases the probability of interacting in
multiple venues, which allows for opportunities for punishment (Tommasi &
Weinschelbaum, 1999) and thus introduces incentives for politicians to comply to
citizens demands 15 . It is important to distinguish among these possible determinants of
jurisdictional fragmentation if we attempt to explain the mounting anecdotal evidence of
citizens’ resistance to jurisdictional consolidation in the presence of nearly identical
preferences for public goods and certain potential for economies of scale.

These aspects may be more important than any perceived gains on the (statistical)
importance of individual votes in smaller jurisdictions. Even in small constituencies, the
probability that a single vote will be decisive is minute. In light of the small statistical
significance of a single vote, a large literature has developed attempting to explain why
individuals vote at all (especially considering the cost of voting is not negligible), the soA preference for proximity to institutions governing the management of common
services may be behind, for example, the widespread creation of home –owner
associations in the U.S. The latter are truly miniature local private governments providing
services traditionally under the responsibility of county governments (such as water
supply, garbage collection, etc.). Although the creation of such associations is due often
to legal requirements to urban site development, they also arise spontaneously and in any
case, have expanded enormously over the last 20 years, representing now nearly 20% of
the American dwellers. Across the board, the services provided by these associations, and
the characteristics of such services do not differ greatly from those previously offered by
elected governments, and although differences can be found at the margin.
15
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called “voting paradox”. Explanations have included a desire to maintain democracy
(Downs, 1957), or even the exercise of a sense of duty (Riker & Ordeshook, 1968). The
general conclusion of this literature is that despite the weight carried by the alternative
explanations, the paradox remains largely unresolved (Blais & Young, 1999).

Such demand for political accountability may not even translate into greater citizen
participation in government, even though proximity to representatives may reduce the
cost of collecting information about local policies. Although direct citizen involvement in
participatory planning, budgeting or evaluation process may not depend on the level of
government analyzed, the use of citizen satisfaction surveys does seem to assist budget
development processes (Jordan & Hackbart, 1999; Melkers & Willoughby, 2005),
informing governments’ decision on new expenditure programs (Riverbank & Kelly,
2006). Along those lines, there seems to be substantial evidence from international
surveys that residents show higher levels of satisfaction from the services received from
local governments than those received from the central government (CIS, several years,
or Dasgupta, Narayan, & Skoufias (2009) for the case of Indonesia).

The literature on performance budgeting provides an alternative avenue to explore how
accountable and responsive local governments are to citizen’s preferences and whether
size affects the level of accountability. By explicitly defining indicators and performance
benchmarks in their budgets, governments not only change the technology of
accountability, but may offer a critical instrument to evaluate how close government
actions are to local preferences, even though one can argue as to whether that was a main
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goal of the introduction of performance based budgeting processes. A recent review of
the literature in this area shows that the widespread implementation of performance
budgeting measures at different levels of government in the US does not seem to have
translated into significant changes in inter or intra-sectoral allocations (Gomez &
Willoughby, 2008). This may reflect a lack of flexibility in adjusting expenditure patterns
to local preferences due to largely committed, politics-driven budgets. But, it could also
be a reflection of how time-consuming it is for citizens to collect and process government
budgetary information. In a pioneering study, Melkers & Willoughby (2001) found that
budgetary officials at the State level were more positive about the impact of results-based
budgeting on states’ budgetary appropriations in the U.S. if the performance
measurement was a requirement of the legislature (and not just of the executive).

There is no clear evidence that the impact of performance measurement on budget
formulation is greater as we move down the government hierarchy. (Melkers &
Willoughby, 2005; p.18) find in a recent contribution to this literature that “less than 50
percent of county and city officials agreed that performance measures were a vital
decision aid on budgetary issues”. They find that the use of performance measures is
more common at the county than at the municipal level. We cannot conclude, however,
that the latter would be an indication that smaller governments are less accountable to
their citizens. In fact, this finding could support the opposite view that because smaller
governments are more accountable to their citizens, there is less need for the
implementation of performance measures.

102

In summary, a review of the literature suggests that the case for economies of scope is
relatively well documented, although the largest contribution of the literature in this area
is concentrated on private sector production processes. We are not able to establish at this
point a connection between higher citizen participation and greater involvement in
budgetary processes at lower levels of government and smaller size of jurisdictions; the
literature in this area is in a very initial state of development.

c. Fragmentation versus equity in local government structures

In the absence of proper fiscal equalization mechanisms, fragmentation of the local
government structure may make the equitable delivery of public services difficult due to
the accompanying fragmentation of fiscal bases (Warner & Hefetz, 2002). On the other
hand, government fragmentation may allow for better access of the poor and rural
population to services tailored to their needs, thus making the system of government
more equitable.

Academic contributions to this debate have focused on the analysis of metropolitan areas
and especially on the fiscal comparison between central metropolitan and sub-urban
areas. As Razin (2000; p.28) puts it, changes in local government organization “re-shape
the rules of the game of local development and influence inter-local disparities”. On that
line, Schneider (1986), in his study of metropolitan disparities in access to services, does
not find support for the hypothesis that fragmentation results in higher service inequality.
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Neither do Morgan & Mareschal (1999) who find no effect of metropolitan fragmentation
on fiscal health.

Contributions in this area have focused on cross-sectional comparisons in expenditure per
capita versus income per capita in the major metropolitan areas of the U.S. A general
conclusion of this literature is that fiscal fragmentation may have been favored as a
strategy to avoid inter-jurisdictional redistribution of local fiscal bases (Ellickson, 1971;
Lewis, 1998).

d. Institutional, Demographic, and Geographical issues
Institutional aspects that may restrict or even encourage further fragmentation have been
also the object of empirical analysis. Nelson (1990), again focusing on the U.S. case,
finds that tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) increase the number of special districts,
which may be created as a way to circumvent tax limits posed upon state and county
government by their citizens. He does not find however evidence that other self-imposed
limits to local debt, or home rule 16 clauses have any significant impact on the number of
governments. Contrary to Nelson’s findings, Bowler & Donovan (2004; p.194) most
recently qualified this finding, arguing that, “absent the pressure of ballot initiatives,
TELs do not lead (in the U.S.) to an increase in the formation of new local governments”.
In the same vein, Lewis (1998) argues that the implementation of Proposition 13, which
imposed severe limits to the rise of property taxes in California, did not lead to an

16

Home rule is defined in (Nelson, 1990) as the allocation of significant autonomy to
local governments in carrying out local functions.
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increase in the level of local government fragmentation in the form of additional special
districts.
The overall size of the public sector may be an important determinant of the
fragmentation of local government systems. This hypothesis has not been fully explored
to date perhaps due to the endogeneity involved in its testing. For instance, Kenny &
Schmidt (1994) find that state aid to school districts is an important determinant of the
great consolidation of school districts observed between 1950 and 1980. They argue that
a larger role of the state in the financing of schools reduces the capacity of districts to
differentiate the education services provided and sort themselves on the basis of average
income in their jurisdictions, so consolidation ensues.
Outside main economic arguments, jurisdictional fragmentation may also (and perhaps
most importantly) be affected by a myriad of institutional reasons such as the form of the
state (federal vs.unitary), the form of government systems (monarchy versus republic), a
history of decentralized government or secession of certain regions, cultural and ethnic
issues, civil or armed conflicts, and so on. More recently, and particularly with regard to
urban municipal consolidation processes, the desire to compete in a “global city”
environment may have prompted metropolitan consolidation processes 17 .
Demographic and geographical variables have traditionally been used as controls in the
empirical analysis of fragmentation. Metro area population and land area are positively
correlated and statistically significant determinants of the number of governments in
Nelson (1990), a result partially supported in Bowler & Donovan (2004). The hypothesis
17

See, for example, the case of Toronto in Sancton (2004).
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behind the inclusion of these variables is that large demographic or geographical areas
may be more difficult to manage and thus fragmentation would be efficiency enhancing.
Nelson’s analysis includes additionally US-specific institutional explanatory variables not
applicable to cross-country analysis. 18
As discussed above, numerous factors may partly explain the level of government
fragmentation encountered in a particular country. Our challenge is now to develop an
empirical model that allows exploring the relative influence of the explanatory variables
discussed, a task approached in the next section.

3.3

Empirical Model

In our theoretical model, we have argued the number of jurisdictions is a function of
several factors, including importantly, the cost of production of services (and thus the
potential for economies of scale), the heterogeneity of preferences, and preferences for
political accountability, which, all things equal, led us to an equilibrium solution where
the optimal jurisdictional size is smaller than in the case where the latter variable is not
considered. In addition, we have discussed additional determinants of jurisdictional
fragmentation, including institutional, geographical and demographic variables.

Generically, we can represent the relationship between optimal jurisdictional size and
these set of relevant variables as:

18

These include whether a referendum or majority approval is required for a territory to
be annexed to a city or for the consolidation of two or more jurisdictions.
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where, using the notation from Chapter 1, N is the jurisdictional size, C represents a
measure of economies of scale, U(DG) depicts the level of heterogeneity of preferences
as defined in Chapter 1, P represents preferences for political accountability and Z is a
vector of variables including institutional, geographic and demographic factors affecting
jurisdictional size.

As discussed, the expected sign of the partial derivatives is as follows:
0,

0,

0

Our first task in the definition of our empirical model is to further clarify our dependent
variable. As already noted above, operationalizing the level of government fragmentation
is a complex task. The literature has favored absolute measures, such as the total number
of governments, over scaling indicators, such as the average population or extension by
jurisdiction. Conversely, the number of local governments for a certain population size
could be used as a relative measure of fragmentation. Nelson (1990) uses in his study of
U.S. government fragmentation the number of governments per metro area, while Bowler
& Donovan (2004) use the number of governments (again both general and specialpurpose governments) in a state at the time of a census. In exploring the effect on
fragmentation of Proposition 13 in California (which importantly limited revenue
collections from the property tax), Lewis (1998) also uses total number of governments
as his variable of interest.
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The use of absolute measures of government fragmentation (i.e. total number of
governments) may be a reasonable empirical strategy when a certain level of
jurisdictional homogeneity can be assumed within the sample, as in country case-studies.
Our aim however is to explore these relationships within the context of as large as
possible a sample of countries. This therefore requires a relative measure of
fragmentation that helps homogenize to the extent possible the individual values of our
dependent variable.

First, we should clarify what is understood as “government” or jurisdiction in this
context. In short, we include in our calculations all levels of government with service
delivery responsibilities and all jurisdictions within each level. The rationale for such a
criterion is that we are interested in exploring whether heterogeneity of preferences for
public services may lead to further fragmentation so as to allow a better matching of
preferences with service delivery. Arguably, a country may be divided in a large number
of jurisdictions, but in the absence of elected governments with some authority over their
budgets, public service delivery may not differ much in that system from a fully
centralized service delivery system. The level of authority over local expenditure and
revenue sources is, however, very hard to measure. In fact, fiscal decentralization experts
around the world have criticized this fact as a major obstacle in the analysis of the impact
of fiscal decentralization on economic growth, or service delivery. Acknowledging that
the level of fiscal autonomy of sub-national government around the world varies wildly,
it is to be expected that a jurisdiction with a locally elected government will have larger
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authority over its budget than a similar territorial unit with de-concentrated units of the
central government. Our analysis will control accordingly for this.

Our estimation strategy is to try different specifications of the dependent variable. First,
in line with previous contributions to the literature, we will use the total number of
jurisdictions (from elected levels of government) as our dependent variable. However, as
just discussed, the heterogeneity of jurisdictions and different sizes across the world
requires the use of a relative indicator of fragmentation that allows homogenizing the
values of our dependent variable. Thus, as derived from our theoretical model in Chapter
1, we will use as dependent variables the ratio of population and area size to the total
number of jurisdictions in the subsequent model specifications. To that extent, all
jurisdictions from elected levels of government (including the central government) are
added, and the values of the above mentioned ratios are calculated for each country.

Lastly, we will also consider a rarely discussed dimension of fragmentation in the
literature: the number of levels of government. As it is the case with other indicators of
government fragmentation, the number of levels of government in a given country is
likely to be correlated with the geographical size of the country and its population size.
This is an aspect of fragmentation largely ignored in the literature, and thus we provide a
first exploration into this issue.
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3.3.1 Hypotheses

Economies of Scale and Fragmentation

In line with the standard model of optimal jurisdictional size, we would expect that the
potential for economies of scale to be a deterrent to high government fragmentation. As
we saw in Chapter 2, the literature has traditionally approximated the measurement of
economies of scale in various ways. Earlier studies used population as a proxy for
economies of scale, while more recent contributions have used either expenditure or
production cost data. As the results from our meta-analysis show, population can be
arguably a rough measure of potential economies of scale, leading to their
underestimation.

In the context of our analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation, using population as our
measure of economies of scale introduces additional problems. For instance, considering
China and Luxemburg, we would have to expect (if population were our proxy for
economies of scale) lower relative levels of government fragmentation in China than in
Luxemburg, since China’s large population would signal to the largest international
potential for economies of scale. That is, obviously, not a reasonable assumption.
Population would seem to be therefore naturally and directly related to the level of
jurisdictional fragmentation, and it is discarded as a valid proxy for economies of scale.
This approach is also consistent with Nelson's (1990) analysis of jurisdictional
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fragmentation in metropolitan areas of the U.S., whereby population is included solely as
an environmental, control variable.

From the meta-analysis conducted in Chapter 2, education, urban transportation, garbage
collection and water and sanitation, in that order, were the services that displayed (from
the studies analyzed) the largest potential for economies of scale. Ideally, one would want
to explore the functional assignments of our sample of countries and ascertain in which of
them are these functions decentralized to sub-national levels of government as an
indication of potential for economies of scale. Regrettably, few countries have formal
statements of expenditure assignments and even where they exist, they are often no more
than broad lists of functional responsibilities with great overlap across tiers of
government. In addition, collecting data on the cost elasticity of production from service
delivery at sub-national levels of government for a sample of close to 200 countries is,
simply, unrealistic.

We are left with few straight-forward options for variables approximating the potential
for economies of scale in public service delivery. The most comprehensive analysis of the
determinants of fragmentation in the U.S., that of Nelson (1990) does not include a
measure of economies of scale, a clear signal of the difficulties encountered in
operationalizing this variable even in the context of a single country case-study. The
Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab, 2010) may offer a possible avenue. Among the
index sub-components, a measure of technological readiness is included. As discussed,
the sources of economies of scale are mostly technological in nature. They may originate
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in gains from more efficient division of labor (internal economies of scale), or can be
derived from an expansion in the industry where the company operates, leading to
increased leverage power with suppliers. Lastly, they may also be due to the use of more
specialized inputs of production. The latter technological dimension is measured by the
GCI Technological readiness sub-index, which approaches the capacity of an economy to
adopt new technologies in order to improve the productivity of the national private
sector 19 . The use of this measure implies assuming that if such technologies are available
to the private sector, it would be more likely that the public sector is also introducing
them in its production processes, thus increasing their productivity 20 . As a downside, the
introduction of technological advances may allow cost reductions even in specialized
production, thus making more efficient the tailoring of public good productions to local
preferences.

Heterogeneous Preferences and Fragmentation

The second set of variables aims to test the hypothesis that heterogeneous preferences
lead to greater jurisdictional fragmentation. This hypothesis is derived from Oates’s
standard postulate that greater preference heterogeneity leads to smaller optimal group
size for service delivery. Heterogeneous preferences are operationalized with measures of
income, race and age dispersion. In terms of income dispersion, higher values of the Gini

The measure is a composite one, including values on aspects such as availability of new
technologies, firm-level technology absorption, legal ICT framework, FDI and
technology transfer, mobile and internet coverage, and personal computers per capita.
20
Alternatively, to be fair, the public sector may suffer from Baumol’s disease, and
witness rise in salaries in response to productivity increases in the private sector.
19

112

income inequality index should lead to preferences for territorially tailored social
policies, and thus a higher the level of jurisdictional fragmentation where local
governments can influence policy design and implementation.

Equally, a measure of ethnic dispersion (taking into consideration race, language, and
religious dimensions) is used to approximate heterogeneous preferences derived from
varying ethnic compositions. 21 Greater ethnic diversity is also expected to translate into a
more fragmented government system that allows reflecting the preferences of the
minorities. First, we used a recent contribution by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly,
Kurlat, & Wacziarg (2003), which provides recalculated measures of the Easterly &
Levine (1997) data and disaggregated indexes of fractionalization, which are used in the
estimations. In order to conduct a sensitivity analysis of results, checking the consistency
of results with alternative measures, we also construct a Herfindahl ethnic and linguistic
fractionalization index on the basis of data on ethnic composition collected from
Population Statistics (see Table 3.1 below). Both indexes were highly correlated and their
alternative inclusion on the model estimations rendered no significant differences.

We include an additional measure of heterogeneity of preferences as an index of age
dispersion. The rationale behind it is that senior citizens are assumed to display well

Martinez-Vazquez et al. (1997) use the share of minorities over the total population in
their analysis of the impact of race dispersion on school district consolidation.
21
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differentiated sets of preferences (i.e. for a start, they may favor higher expenditures in
health and lower expenditure in education as they do not have school-age children 22 ).

The fractionalization Herfindahl indexes (for both ethno linguistic and age
fractionalization) used in this analysis have the form:

1
with 0 ≤

≤1

where gij is the share of group i in country j in unit terms. Thus, the larger the value of the
index, the larger is the fractionalization of the country, and thus we assume the more
likely a fragmented system of government will be in place to cater to those heterogeneous
preferences. At the other extreme, where there is only one group, and thus the share of
the group over the total population is 1 (or 100 percent), the fractionalization index would
be zero. Thus, positive signs are expected in both coefficients for the age and ethnicfractionalization variables.

Measuring Political Accountability
Our variable of interest, political accountability, is operationalized in various forms. As
discussed, the existence of elected government representatives at the sub-national levels

On the other hand, housing values are generally linked in the U.S. for instance to
school quality. Or seniors may have grandchildren attending local schools, which would
balance the set of preferences assumed by this indicator.
22
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of government (as opposed to appointed by central government authorities) is a critical
indicator of political accountability. Sub-national officials can be removed from office if
policies are not reflective of the majority preferences, the very political link that is
required for fiscal decentralization to succeed. However, the existence of sub-national
elections is a necessary but not sufficient condition for accountability to be exercised.
Several pseudo-democracies and even dictatorships around the world hold sub-national
“elections”. In these countries, the range of candidates is severely limited to those of the
party in power or political allies. No credible political alternatives are offered to citizens
to choose from. To take account of the democratic status of countries around the world,
we interact our dummy variable measuring the existence of sub-national elections with an
index of legislative competitiveness from the Political Institutions Database (World
Bank, 2006).

In addition, we include in our model the World Bank’s Governance Index sub-component
of “voice and accountability”. This indicator (with a minimum value of 0 and a maximum
of 5) aims to measure the “extent to which citizens of a country are able to participate in
the selection of governments (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2008)”. The governance
indicators collected by the World Bank include an additional indicator, “Government
Effectiveness”, which aims to measure the capacity of the local bureaucracy to provide
quality public services, and its independence from political pressures. Both measures
cover aspects of our variable of interest (political accountability) and offer the
opportunity of reducing the endogeneity of the model by using them as a proxy for the
latter. Arguably, the “voice and accountability” indicator represents more closely the

115

capacity to elect and exercise control of the citizenry over their political class, the very
essence of accountability.

A third dimension of accountability that is explored is the authority of local
representatives over tax collection and spending policies. It may be the case local
authorities are elected but still budgets are “conditional’ in their use so that no spending
discretion is allowed. Additionally, local authorities may not enjoy revenue raising
capacity at the margin, which also limits their ability to respond to local needs. We
measure this dimension in two ways, first, including a variable measuring the share of
total expenditure conducted at the sub-national level, a traditional indicator of fiscal
decentralization. Second, we include a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the subnational governments have authority over taxing, spending or legislating (World Bank,
2006). Unfortunately, this variable is only available for a limited number of countries,
reducing the number of observations importantly.

Other variables that may importantly influence the level of jurisdictional fragmentation
include the share of public expenditure out of GDP (for countries where government
employment is the main source of family income in rural areas for instance). This
variable presents however a clear problem of endogeneity, as more fragmented systems
of government are more likely to show also a higher government share in GDP, and is
therefore not used in our final model specification.

Alternatively, the existence of

constitutional provisions guaranteeing the provision of social services as a right of the
citizenry (with obvious fiscal and governmental implications) may greatly affect the level
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of public sector expenditure. Unfortunately, the latter variable could not be obtained as
our search for constitutional texts did not render recent versions in English that could be
coded for a large number of countries.

Additional Institutional Hypotheses

A wide array of institutional variables may affect the level of fragmentation of a country,
as we have previously discussed. The available political institutions data offers several
alternatives to test institutional hypothesis in this context. Arguably, the impact of
institutional variables is likely to extend beyond any single year and as such, a crosssectional analysis for a single year will not capture the full implications of maintaining or
changing any critical aspect of the institutional fabric of a country. Our results in this area
should therefore be taken with caution.

First, we test the impact of having a presidential, parliamentary or assembly elected
president on jurisdictional fragmentation. Second, we test whether the existence of a
nationalistic party in power (arguably an advocate of unitary systems) leads to lower
levels of fragmentation 23 . As additional tests to the quality of democracy, we introduce a
variable measuring whether there is a constitutional limit on the number of years an
executive can serve before elections are called. Ideally, following Nelson (1990), we
would have liked to include in our analysis whether provisions exist for minimum
As an example of the caveat introduced above, if a nationalistic party has just been
elected, despite of its ideological leanings, it might not be able to affect the jurisdictional
organization of the country unless it keeps in power for an extended period of time. From
that point of view, the variable is likely not to be significant in a cross-sectional analysis.

23
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population sizes for new jurisdiction creation. We were unable to collect this variable for
a large number of countries where legislation is not easily accessible.

Finally, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that movements from autocratic to
democratic systems of government release pent up pressure for jurisdictional
fragmentation. Indonesia may be a good example where the advent of democracy
unleashed a process of fragmentation (pemekaran) that translated into an increase in the
number of sub-national level jurisdictions in search for democratic spaces of
representation. The end of armed conflicts may also lead to such a process of new
jurisdiction formation. We measure these dimensions with a single dummy variable with
value one when either a significant transition to a more democratic system of government
(measured by an increase in the Polity IV project index of 3 or more points) occurred in
the country over the last 10 years.

Geographic Control Variables

Arguably, country size is related to government fragmentation. Difficulties in reaching
isolated populations from the political center are a strong incentive to create sub-national
levels of government that can deliver public services. We use country area (in square
kilometers) to measure country size. Additionally, a measure of geographic accessibility
is required, as countries with small land area may still be highly fragmented if they are of
mountainous territory or display other natural features that difficult accessibility. Such
lack of accessibility would lead to a preference for smaller governments closer to the
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citizens. Absent a better measure of accessibility, we use the ratio of the highest to the
lowest altitude in a country as a proxy for accessibility. Ideally, we would like to use
many altitude points in every country to evaluate their dispersion, but such information
could not be obtained.

Alternative variables to consider in order to control for the way geographical
characteristics may affect jurisdictional fragmentation could include the geographical
position of a country, such as whether it is landlocked or coastal and thus we tested the
impact of a dummy variable measuring this dimension. We also include a variable
denoting the continent of location of the country and test for the impact of latitude, a
variable that has proved highly significant in the analysis of economic growth patterns.

3.3.2 Estimation Methodology and Data

For our estimation strategy, we first approach the analysis of the determinants of the
number of levels of government in a given country. Subsequently, we test the main
hypothesis of model relative jurisdictional fragmentation across levels. The rationale for
such an approach is the understanding that, although certain simultaneity in the process is
obvious, presented with the opportunity to define the territorial structure of a country (for
instance in the Constitution drafting processes), or at least to approach its reform, the
logical sequential order of events is to first define the number of levels of government
and, on that basis, determine the mechanisms for creation of new jurisdictions (or their
merger) within each level. For example, the 1978 Spanish Constitution only defined the
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different levels of government (regional, provincial, municipal). The Organic Law
regulating this constitutional aspect established that in instances where regions are
formed by just one province, the provincial level of government is sub-summed into the
regional one as there is perfect overlap. The number of regions eventually created, and
the number of municipalities existing currently in Spain is the result of an institutional
process where most forces considered in this paper were at play. 24

As discussed in the previous section, the number of levels of government in a given
country is a largely unattended dimension of jurisdictional fragmentation. By selecting
the number of tiers of sub-national levels of government as the dependent variable, we
will observe that while some countries have two tiers or even more, there are some other
countries that have only one tier or none. Thus Tobit estimation appears to be an adequate
estimation approach (Tobin 1950). Because the variable is censored at 0, in its standard
mathematical expression, in terms of a latent variable y* (Baum, 2006):

′

0

where

0
,
0

is a row vector or explanatory variables, β is a vector of parameters to be

estimated, and μ ~ N(0,1) is the error term.
To date for instance, the Constitution in Spain has not been amended to include the
names of the regions in its articles.
24
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In our sample, this variable either shows zeros for those countries with no sub-national
levels of government or a positive integer between 1 and 4. Arguably, there are other
alternatives to operationalize this aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation. For instance, we
could have collapsed all positive values and turned this censored variable into a binary
one, but at the cost of losing important information on the different number of tiers of
sub-national governments. Alternatively, we could have counted all levels of government
in the variable, including the central one, thus allowing for the use of an ordered probit
model fit, another maximum likelihood estimation method. However, the cardinal nature
of the variable suggests that ordered probit estimation is not the right approach 25 . Lastly,
truncated data estimation methods were not appropriate since the data generation process
did not present this characteristic. We could perhaps convert the variable into a truncated
one by discarding all observations with a value of zero (Baum, 2006), but again at the
cost of degrees of freedom and loss of information.

Since this is the first exploration of the determinants of the number of sub-national levels
of governments in a given country we maintain the same set of explanatory variables
proposed in our theoretical framework, and therefore estimate the following equation:

We would expect that the number of sub-national tiers of government in a given
country also depends on the number of tiers that already exist. It would become more
difficult to add another tier if a relatively high number of sub-national levels of
government already exists. Thus, the variable is non-ordinal in nature.

25
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where L is the number of levels of government, Ci represents economies of scale, Ui
reflects the impact of heterogeneous preferences on over all welfare, Pi is our measure of
political accountability, and Zji is a vector of other institutional and geographical
variables. The marginal effects on the observed value L will be equal to the individual
coefficients times the probability that the latent variable value is between a certain
interval. In practice, our interpretation of results will focus of the statistical significance
of the coefficients and the direction (sign) of the relationships found.

Once we have explored the determinants of government fragmentation into different tiers,
we turn to the analysis of the more traditional aspects of jurisdictional fragmentation.
Summary statistics for the data used in this analysis are provided in Table 3.1 below. The
data have been collected from a wide variety of sources. As the database used for this
empirical part of the analysis is a cross-section on nearly 200 countries, OLS estimation
will be applied to the model specifications using the total number of jurisdictions, the
average population per jurisdiction, and the average area per jurisdiction as alternative
dependent variables.

For simplicity, we will assume a linear functional form for this relationship and thus the
equation to be estimated is:
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where N is the number of jurisdictions (or the average population or area per jurisdiction,
depending on the specification), Ci represents economies of scale, Ui reflects the impact
of heterogeneous preferences on over all welfare, Pi is our measure of political
accountability, and Zji is a vector of other institutional and geographical variables.

At the outset, and considering the multiple avenues through which the levels of
fragmentation of a country can be determined, our model may leave out, due to lack of
available data, critical explanatory variables and thus suffer from omitted variable bias
that leads to higher standard errors. To explore this aspect we will conduct standardized
Ramsey tests. Moreover, the size of our sample (effectively around 143 observations)
limits the number of variables than can be included in the analysis. However, regional
dummy variables are introduced to absorb common variation in regional fragmentation
patterns.

We had also initially assumed a linear form for our model, which may not accurately
reflect the relationship between the variables. In order to test the linearity of the
relationship hypothesized, we conducted graphical analysis, plotting the residuals against
the suggested predictors in early model specifications and exploring any possible
deviations from linearity. This analysis suggested the need to transform several of the
variables into logarithmic form, and to opt for a quadratic form in the relationship
between population and jurisdictional fragmentation.
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Both the White and Breusch-Pagan tests showed a certain amount of heteroskedasticity as
it was to be expected from the nature of our sample. Accordingly, robust standard errors
were calculated to correct the heteroskedastic errors.
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Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Dataset
Variable
Name

Max

Min

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Obs.

Description

Source

Year

Population

1,330,044,605

5,079

30,724,686

123,328,416

218

Total Country Population

International Database, US
Census Bureau

2008

6.93

1.3

3.78

1.18

132

Sum of GDP plus imports, minus
exports, normalized on a 1-7 scale

World Economic Forum

2008

6.15

2.19

3.80

1.09

132

Age014

50.00

13.40

28.89

10.45

218

Age1564

79.90

47.80

63.51

6.75

218

Age65+

22.80

0.90

7.60

5.11

218

AHV

0.67

0.46

0.51

0.03

218

AleELF

0.93

0

0.44

0.26

187

AleLin

0.92

0.00

0.39

0.28

192

AleRel
Country
Area

0.86

0.00

0.44

0.23

202

16,995,800

2.00

597,974

1,774,385

218

Gini

74.61

24.00

40.88

9.91

151

ConIneq

1.00

0

GDPpc

85,382

298

13,259

15,704

182

Purchasing Power Parity GDP Data

United Nations HDR

2007

VAI

4.07

0.19

2.49

1.00

205

Voice and Accountability Index

World Bank

2007

GEI

4.91

0.15

2.48

1.00

209

World Bank

2007

SubDem
Status

2

0

1.1

0.882

190

Own Calculations

2009

SubDem
Status2

0

7

5.08

2.93

171

Government Effectiveness Index
Interaction term; Sub-national
Elections*Democratic Status
(0=Dictatorship, 1=Pseudo
Democracy, 2=Electoral
Democracy)
Interaction Term: Sub-National
Elections *Index of Legislative
Competitiveness (0=No legislature –
7=Multiple parties got seats in
Parliament)

World Bank and Own
Calculations

2006

Domestic
Market
Size
Techno
Readiness

151

Composite Index of Technological
World Economic Forum
Capacity
Percentage of Population under 15
International Database, US
years of age
Census Bureau
Percentage of Population between 15 International Database, US
and 64 years of age
Census Bureau
Percentage of Population over 64
International Database, US
years of age
Census Bureau
Age Herfindahl Country Value
Ethno linguistic Fractionalization
Alesina et al (2003)
Herfindahl Index
Language Fractionalization Index
Alesina et al (2003)

2008
2008
2008
2008

Religion Fractionalization Index

Alesina et al (2003)
International Database, US Census
Total Country Area in square kms
Bureau
Several
Income/Expenditure Inequality
U.N. Wider Database
Years
Dummy variable with value 1 for Consumption inequality data
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Table 8. Summary Statistics of the Dataset (Continued)
Finite
Term

1

0

0.894

0.308

170

Existence of a Finite Term for the
Legislature

World Bank

2006

Polity IV

2008

Change
Polity4

1

0

0.21

0.41

171

Dummy variable with Value 1 if
increase in the Democratic Polity IV
project index of 3 or more points
occurred in the country over the last
10 years.

Level2

118

2

17

18

211

Number of Jurisdictions in Level #

Several

Level3

14,000

5

442

1,352

164

Number of Jurisdictions in Level #

Several

Level4

240,073

-

7,237

31,144

62

Number of Jurisdictions in Level #

Several

Level5

42,008

432

14,822

17,954

10

Number of Jurisdictions in Level #

Several

Pop/Juris

577,674

542.9

56,736

86,057

212

Average Population per jurisdiction

Own Calculations

Area/Juris

76,501

0.18

1,981

6,261

212

Average Area per Jurisdiction

Own Calculations

Sublevels

4

0

1.944

.772

196

Number of Sub-national Levels of
Government

Several
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Several
Years
Several
Years
Several
Years
Several
Years
Several
Years
Several
Years
Several
Years

3.4

Results

We now turn to the analysis of the results from the estimation of the first model of
jurisdictional fragmentation using the number of sub-national levels of government of a
given country as the dependent variable. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation we argued that
the creation of a new level of government would be justified if overall welfare is
improved (considering losses from economies of scale, gains from tailoring preferences
to citizens, and preferences for political accountability) by assigning the provision of
public goods and services from the central (or local) level of government to a new subnational level.

The hypothesized determinants of the number of sub-national levels of
government coincide therefore with those used in the above analysis of jurisdictional
fragmentation. As we discussed, we use maximum likelihood estimation (i.e. a tobit
regression model) to conduct this analysis. The results of the tobit regression model are
shown in Table 3.2 below.

From our results, it would seem that the vertical structure of government might be
solely related to “size” variables and not to other institutional or preference-related
aspects. As naturally expected, we find a strong positive relationship between population
and fragmentation, defined as the number of sub-national tiers of government. Equally, a
large country area seems to increase the probability of having more sub-national levels of
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government. Both results are robust to the different model specifications, even after
regional dummy variables are included.

Of the set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences, it would not seem
that any of them offers significant insights as to their impact on this aspect of
fragmentation. We could not find either any significant relationship between our set of
institutional variables and the number of levels of sub-national government. This is
somewhat surprising since we had expected that for example more ethnic
fractionalization would have led to a higher probability of having regional level
governments representing those differences. It would seem that, at least in our sample,
geographical effects, captured partly by the regional dummies, are more important
determinants of this aspect of jurisdictional fragmentation.
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Table 9. Results from the Tobit Model
Dep. Variable: Number of Sub-national Levels of Government
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
.091**
.086**
.092**
Population
(.041)
(.042)
(.042)
.064**
.060*
.055*
Area
(.031)
(.031)
(.029)
-.361
-.364
-.281
AleELF
(.224)
(.228)
(.229)
-.004
-.004
.006
Gini
(.005)
(.005)
(.006)
.144
.141
.196
ConIneq
(.139)
(.145)
(.165)
-.058
-.048
-.049
GDPpc
(.058)
(.063)
(.062)
-.024
.188
.022
AHV
(1.785)
(1.894)
(1.817)
Sub National
.006
.001
Elections*Dem Status 2
(.021)
(.022)
-.037
-.084
VAI
(.057)
(.058)
-.089
Oceania
(.183)
-.383*
South America
(.205)
-.535***
Central America
(.157)
-.684***
North America
(.217)
-.386**
Asia
(.174)
-.379
Africa
(.213)
.673
.682
.733
Constant
(1.221)
(1.269)
(1.192)
Number of Observations
144
141
141
Pseudo R-squared
0.1358
0.1259
0.1684
Log Pseudo-Likelihood
-114.65
-113.25
-107.75
.536
.540
.519
Sigma
(.034)
(.033)
(.034)
Probability > F
0.000
0.000
0.000
Notes: MLE estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. Population, GDPpc
and Area in logarithmic form. Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy
variables.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively
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Estimation results for the next three measures of jurisdictional fragmentation are
presented in Table 3.3 below. As discussed, we use three measures of jurisdictional
fragmentation: total number of jurisdictions, population average and area size average per
jurisdiction. For each of these variables, we estimate three model specifications. In the
first one (Models 1, 4 and 7 respectively), we test the standard economic hypotheses of
fragmentation, that is, the impact of economies of scale and of heterogeneity of
preferences in the level of jurisdictional fragmentation.

Ramsey tests were run on each of the regressions, searching for possible omitted
variable bias, with negative results. 26 Initial plotting of the regressions residuals against
the main variables of interest showed departures from the linearity assumption, and thus
transformation of certain independent variables were required. In particular, we
hypothesized a quadratic relationship between fragmentation and population levels; we
also transformed area and per capita GDP into a logarithmic form, and also took the logs
of our dependent variables. Correlation was found among some variables (especially
between population and area as it was to be expected), leading to a certain amount of
multicollinearity. Most of our coefficients are however individually and jointly
significant, and very robust to different model specifications, both in terms of their size
and signs, so this aspect did not seem to be relevant.

We applied the Breusch-Pagan test to our initial model specification, with the
results suggesting a certain amount of heteroscedasticity existed, confirmed by the
26

We used both linktest and ovtest Stata commands, with both tests supporting the
hypothesis of no omitted variables in the model.
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plotting of residuals against some of the quasi-ordinal variables in the sample (such as
Sub-national Democratic status). As a result, our final estimations calculated and reported
robust standard errors.

Our second model specification includes proxy variables attempting to measure
demand for political accountability. From our theoretical framework, we derived the
result that, all things equal, demand for political accountability should translate into a
smaller optimal jurisdictional size, and thus lead to higher fragmentation. Results of this
specification can be seen in Models 2, 5 and 8. Finally, our third model specification (for
which results are presented in Model 3, 6 and 9 below) included a series of geographical
and institutional control variables meant to test the robustness of the findings.

Regrettably, the variable approximating potential for economies of scale
(technological readiness) proved insignificant and did not add to the overall explanatory
power of the model. Individual significance tests confirmed this finding and the variable
was discarded from the final model specification. This result left us without a proxy
variable for economies of scale, a fact already common to other studies on the
determinants of fragmentation. As we discussed, the difficulties in approximating this
dimension seem insurmountable at this time. Ideally, as in Chapter 2, we would like to
input into the analysis the “true value” of economies of scale for local services (that is,
the true value of the cost elasticity of production) in a given country derived from a metaanalysis such as the one conducted in the previous chapter. That is not an available option
right now. The proxies considered (population, technological readiness, market size) all
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present serious identification issues or are simply not significant in the empirical analysis.
The absence of this variable would mean that the variation in the level of jurisdictional
fragmentation across countries due to the different potential for economies of scale is left
in the error term, reducing the explanatory power of the model. However, in terms of the
remaining set of hypotheses, we still draw important conclusions, outlined below.

First, the results show that, as expected, population and area are naturally and
positively correlated with the level of jurisdictional fragmentation of a country.
Population seems to be non-linearly related to jurisdictional fragmentation. Higher
population leads to increasing levels of fragmentation, but at a decreasing rate. This
relationship holds both for absolute measures of fragmentation (total number of
jurisdictions) or relative ones (ratio of area to number of jurisdictions). The maximum
level of fragmentation is reached at a population level of around 1 billion people, a level
that only India and China have reached. An alternative model specification was tested
whereby population was included as explanatory variable in the model in a logarithmic
(and not quadratic) form. The estimation of this specification showed that a 1 percent
increase in population led to a 0.68 percent increase in the total number of jurisdictions, a
less than proportional increase. The relationship between area and fragmentation is
equally significant. A 1 percent increase in country area leads to a .3 percent increase in
the total number of jurisdictions in the full model specification.

The set of variables measuring heterogeneity of preferences also offers
statistically significant and sizable results. Our measure of ethno-linguistic fragmentation
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suggests, perhaps counter-intuitively, that greater dispersion on ethnic and linguistic
groups leads to lower jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of smaller number of
jurisdictions and higher average area. The result may a priori seem surprising, but it is
very robust across model specifications, and even when an alternative measure of ethnolinguistic fragmentation is used. It is reasonable to assume that ethno-linguistic
differences would lead to heterogeneous preferences, but the data would seem to show
that the end result may be a lower level of jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of
the total number of jurisdictions and larger average size. A possible explanation for this
result is that ethno-linguistic fractionalization is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth
countries with lower quality of government (Alberto Alesina et al., 2003). Already
(Aghion, Alesina, & Trebbi, 2002) find that ethnic fractionalization is inversely related to
quality of democracy 27 . It follows that countries with lower quality of government (less
democratic societies) and high ethno-linguistic fractionalization are less likely to create
spaces for democratic representation with additional levels of government or new
jurisdictions. This is an aspect for which we already control for in our model however 28 ,
so we are left without a better explanation for the consistency of this relationship.

Our second variable approximating heterogeneous preferences, the age dispersion
index, displays the hypothesized sign, but it is not robust across specifications. It would
seem that greater age dispersion leads to a smaller average jurisdictional size, but we find

A result robust in our sample even when we control for country latitude.
In fact we find a negative correlation between the Alesina et al. measure of ethnic
fractionalization and the variables approximating quality of democracy in our sample.
27
28
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no statistically significant evidence of the variable affecting the total number of
jurisdictions or average population size.

Larger per capita GDP also leads to lower levels of fragmentation in our sample.
To the extent that overall increases in per capita income tend to homogenize preferences
for public good provision, this result may be a reasonable one to expect. Although
significant, the relationship between jurisdictional fragmentation and inequality shows
that increases in inequality may lead to lower jurisdictional fragmentation overall, a result
that goes against what we expected. The results are not robust however to the insertion of
regional dummies in the model.

Our variables approximating preferences for political accountability are
significant and display the hypothesized sign. The interaction term formed by the
existence of sub-national elections and a measure of democratic status or legislative
competitiveness proved to be significant and robust to different model specifications. The
sign of the coefficient is positive, indicating that increased demand for political
accountability leads to higher jurisdictional fragmentation, both in terms of a greater
number of jurisdictions or smaller average area per jurisdictions. It could be argued that
this relationship may be endogenous, and that in more jurisdictionally fragmented
countries citizens are more participative and more likely to demand enhanced political
accountability. That may not be the case however. As we discussed, (Lowery & Lyons,
1989) showed no evidence of better information levels of citizens at lower levels of
government. In any case it would seem that the construction of the interaction term would
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dispel doubts as to the possible endogeneity between these two variables. The use of an
independent assessment of democratic quality and of an index of legislative
competitiveness also independent from the territorial organization of the country should
diminish the possible problem of double causation. The World Bank Voice and
Accountability Index, a “measure of the extent to which citizens are able to participate in
the selection of governments”, displayed identical sign as the earlier measure of
democratic quality but it was only statistically significant when average area per
jurisdiction was selected as the dependent variable.

We explored several other avenues through which institutional aspects related to
demand for political accountability could have impacted the level of jurisdictional
fragmentation. First, we included the number of sub-national levels of government as an
explanatory variable. A larger number of jurisdictions is likely to be found in countries
with more levels of government. The reason behind is that intermediate levels of
government are able to deliver services to local or municipal governments unable to do so
due to their small size. Lack of resort to such intermediate levels of government (i.e.,
county governments in the U.S., regional districts in British Columbia, or provincial
governments in Spain) would introduce incentives to local mergers, and thus reduce
jurisdictional fragmentation. This relationship proved to be highly significant. As
hypothesized, more levels of government led to an increase in the overall number of
jurisdictions. The results, however, did not suggest that a similarly strong statistical
relationship existed between levels of government and the average jurisdictional size.
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Secondly, we tested a set of several institutional aspects that may have reasonably
affected the level of fragmentation and are proxies for democratic quality. These
included; 1) the number of years of the executive in office (signal of quasi-democratic
systems when its value exceeds 8); 2) the constitutional existence of a finite term in
office before new elections are called; 3) whether a nationalist party is in power (more
likely to advocate for a less decentralized state) and 4) the parliamentary system of the
country. Of this set of variables, only the existence of a finite term in office seemed to
significantly affect the total number of jurisdictions, but not their average size. It must be
again mentioned that some of the explanatory variables we use may exert their influence
over the process of creation or merger of jurisdictions over time. This influence may take
more time than one year in which we are observing the data and therefore our crosssectional analysis is limited in this respect.

Thirdly, we introduced in the analysis available indicators measuring the size of
the public sector in the GDP, the share of sub-national expenditure over the national total,
and a variable measuring whether fiscal authority existed over expenditure or tax policies
at the local level (for which only 29 observations were available). We could not find
significant relationships between these variables and the level of jurisdictional
fragmentation and were eliminated from final model specifications. Fourthly, the variable
approximating built up demands for jurisdictional fragmentation that may have been
released via recent advances to the democratic quality of system of government proved to
be non-significant.
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Finally, in order to at least partly to account for the country fixed effects from our
sample, we introduced regional dummy variables. Using Europe as the group of reference
(arguably the most fragmented region together with North America), the dummy
variables showed significant and lower levels of fragmentation. Their inclusion did not
affect the significance of our main variables for the different hypothesis and added
importantly to the overall explanatory value of the model.
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Table 10. Results from the OLS Estimation

Population
(Milllions)
Population
Squared
Area
AleELF
Gini
ConIneq
GDPpc
AHV

Dep. Variable: Log of Total Number of
Jurisdictions
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
.020***
.021***
.019***
(.003)
(.003)
(.003)
-.1x10-4*** -.1x10-4*** -.1x10-4***
(0.02x10-4)
(0.02x10-4)
(0.02x10-4)
.384***
.266***
.292***
(.061)
(.060)
(.057)
-1.899***
-1.380**
- 1.392**
(.583)
(.539)
(.565)
-.024**
-.024***
-.006
(.011)
(.009)
(.011)
-.235
-.407
-.211
(.279)
(.250)
(.273)
-.140
-.249**
-.324***
(.146)
(.128)
(.138)
-4.590
-6.348
-5.529
(4.513)
(4.095)
(4.317)

Dep. Variable: Log of Area to
Jurisdictions Ratio
Model 4
Model 5
Model 6
-.006**
-.006**
-.006*
(.003)
(.003)
(.003)
0.04x10-4*
0.04x10-4*
0.04x10-4*
(0.02x10-4) (0.02x10-4) (0.02x10-4)
2.553***
(.692)
.0362**
(.014)
.141
(.323)
.401**
(.186)
-14.552**
(7.041)

2.251***
(.745)
.007
(.016)
-.056
(.348)
. .413*
(.212)
-11.792
(7.119)

.145***
(.035)

.137***
(.038)

-.132**
(.055)

-.123**
(.059)

.118
(.121)
.907***
(.199)

.099
(.127)
.806***
(.201)
-1.531***
(.387)
-.875**
(.431)
-.805***
(.369)
.206
(.713)
-.568
(.388)
-.935**
(.442)
6.208**
(2.841)

-.333**
(.157)
-.238
(.198)

-.333*
(.170)
-.235
(.203)
2.614***
(.822)
1.892***
(.521)
.305
(.565)
.856
(.728)
.701
(.572)
1.229**
(.624)
-3.118
(4.236)

Sub National
Elections*Dem
Status 2
VAI
Sub Levels
Oceania
South America
Central America
North America
Asia
Africa
Constant

1.553
(2.467)

6.131**
(2.762)

2.851***
( .711)
.033**
(.015)
.166
(.345)
.181
(.192)
-11.641*
(6.507)

7.949**
(3.612)

-4.936
(4.137)

Number of
144
141
141
144
141
141
Observations
R-squared
0.58
0.67
0.71
0.26
0.31
0.39
Probability > F
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic
form.
Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy variables.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively
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Table 10. Results from the OLS Estimation (Cont.)
Dep. Variable: Log of Population to Jurisdictions Ratio
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9
-.015
.017
.026
Area
(.055)
(.054)
(.059)
1.178
.826
.884
AleELF
(.547)
(.529)
(.562)
.013
.017
.003
Gini
(.011)
(.012)
(.015)
.157
.241
.026
ConIneq
(.275)
(.247)
(.264)
-.062
.071
.187
GDPpc
(.139)
(.137)
(.146)
2.635
3.932
4.362
AHV
(4.474)
(4.177)
(4.281)
Sub National
-.143***
-.128***
Elections*Dem Status 2
(.037)
(.041)
-.116
-.072
VAI
(.133)
(.131)
-.427**
-.357*
Sub Levels
(.195)
(.204)
.789**
Oceania
(.382)
.677
South America
(.492)
.724*
Central America
(.396)
-.598
North America
(.751)
.794*
Asia
(.417)
.948*
Africa
(.498)
8.569***
8.362***
6.724**
Constant
(3.067)
(2.958)
(2.941)
Number of Observations
144
141
141
R-squared
0.13
0.23
0.28
Probability > F
0.005
0.000
0.000
Notes: OLS estimation. Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. GDPpc and Area in logarithmic
form.
Europe is the reference group for the regional dummy variables.
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively
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3.5 Conclusions

In this chapter, we have tested the traditional hypotheses of the literature on
optimal jurisdictional size (economies of scale and heterogeneous preferences), but also
the implications of preferences for political accountability on the international levels of
jurisdictional fragmentation observed around the world.

We have, for the first time to our knowledge, analyzed a largely unexplored
dimension of jurisdictional fragmentation, the determinants of the number of levels of
government, together with more traditional measures of fragmentation used in the
literature. Overall, the vertical structure of government, at least in our sample, might be
mostly related to “size” variables and not to other institutional or preference-related
aspects. Both population and area size are positively correlated to the number of
government tiers of a country. This result is common to all model specifications and
dependent variables used as measures of fragmentation.

Our main result, in line with the conclusions of our theoretical model, is that
preferences for political accountability would lead to smaller jurisdictional size and a
larger number of governments. These results are robust across different model
estimations. They also lend strong support to our contention that accountability needs to
be added to the list of critical dimensions in the theory of optimal jurisdictional size, even
though this aspect has not yet been fully incorporated into the standard economic theory.
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Additionally, we find support to the hypothesis that the higher the number of
government tiers, the more likely it is that jurisdictional fragmentation will be high.
Small local governments have less of an incentive to consolidate into larger jurisdictions
if the immediately higher government tier provides, assuming subsidiary responsibility,
the services the former are unable to due to their limited capacity.

Although there is a strong theoretical case to expect that more heterogeneous
preferences should lead, all other things equal, to more jurisdictional fragmentation, the
set of variables used to approximate this aspect display mixed results. In some cases,
although the variable proposed may be certainly reflective of heterogeneous preferences,
other interfering variables may affect the causality of the relationship sought. High ethnolinguistic fragmentation, for instance, seem to be related to lower levels of fragmentation
due to political economy issues related to the quality of democracy in countries that show
high

ethno-linguistic

fractionalization.

As

we

have

argued,

ethno-linguistic

fractionalization is more prevalent in poorer, low-growth countries with lower quality of
government. Thus, less democratic societies with high ethno-linguistic fractionalization
are less likely to create spaces for democratic representation with additional levels of
government or new jurisdictions.

Our analysis underlines also the need to continue to explore new avenues for the
measurement of economies of scale on local service delivery, a critical aspect that the
empirical literature, including our contribution, has not been able to address adequately.
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CHAPTER 4
A ROADMAP FOR THE ANALYSIS OF JURISDICTIONAL FORMATION
AND REFORM

“…it is still too early to conclude that an optimum size has been established for
metropolitan and local governments.” Breton (1965)

4.1 Introduction

Is a country’s vertical structure of government efficient? Should it reduce the number of
small jurisdictions via consolidation and jurisdictional merger? Under what
circumstances should the country consider the creation of a new government tier? These
and similar questions are posed regularly in countries around the world, regardless of
their development level, cultural ties, religious leanings or cultural and institutional
fabric. The answers to such questions are not straightforward. As in many other aspects
of public policy, we have to conclude that there is no single ideal level of jurisdictional
fragmentation. Delving in the empirical and applied policy literature in this area, we may
however be able to suggest a process to develop a solid technical base to assist policy
formulation. Thus, in this final chapter, we aim to provide an analytical framework that
guides the formulation of jurisdictional reform by synthesizing the empirical results of
this dissertation and summarizing the lessons learnt from the international experience.

142

The international experience shows that countries around the world have defined a vast
number of criteria, both qualitative and quantitative, for regulating the formation of new
jurisdictions (or the merge of existing ones). The former offer enhanced flexibility (and
are perhaps more vulnerable to political manipulation) and have therefore been favored
commonly over more transparent quantitative measures (Handry & Martinez-Vazquez,
2008). The review of these criteria offers a first assessment of how theoretical
considerations related to the determination of optimal jurisdictional size have been
translated into policy. It also represents a benchmark to analyze to what extent current
levels of jurisdictional fragmentation fit the ideal “efficient” patterns.

Among the most widely used criteria for regulating new jurisdiction formation, most
countries use different forms of population criteria. These vary significantly even within
a given geographic region (for example, from the 50,000 people requirement in Ecuador
to the 5,000 requirement of Paraguay in Latin America) and may be determined either by
the national government (for regional and municipal tiers) or, in federal or quasi-federal
countries, by regional levels of government (for municipal or local levels, such as in
Argentina, Spain, Australia, etc.). In addition, some countries have required that the
formation of a new jurisdiction be subjected to minimum land area criteria. For instance,
in Colombia, a new municipality must not represent more than one third of the territory
of the municipality from which it emerges. In addition, it is normally required that the
territory of the new jurisdiction has territorial continuity.
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The review process for new jurisdiction formation also includes generally the analysis of
the socio-economic conditions of the localities and the population support for the request,
thus evaluating to a certain extent the existence of heterogeneous preferences. In Latvia
for instance, the Council for Administrative Territorial Reform conducts a full
investigation for new jurisdiction formation that includes these issues. Additionally,
higher tiers of government tend to evaluate the fiscal and administrative feasibility of the
future jurisdictions. In Mexico, the law requires that the evaluation of requests for new
jurisdiction formation includes a feasibility analysis that demonstrates the new
jurisdictions will have sufficient fiscal capacity to run their administrations.

At the origin of demands for new jurisdiction formation we also find a preference for
political accountability or accessibility to local government representatives. Among the
criteria used to evaluate the representatives’ capacity to attend to their constituencies
when considering new jurisdictions we find population density, average distance to the
new jurisdiction capital, land area, or even the state of local communications
infrastructure as a proxy for travel time to the capital center (Mexico).

In a recent report on the process of jurisdictional fragmentation observed in Indonesia,
Handry & Martinez-Vazquez (2008) distil the main criteria that should lead the
consideration of new jurisdiction formation: 1) the production/cost efficiency criterion; 2)
the representation/political responsiveness/accountability criterion; 3) the financial/fiscal
capacity criterion; and 4) the administrative capacity criterion. In this chapter we
combine those criteria with the results of the empirical analysis conducted in chapters 3
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and 4 of this dissertation to provide an analytical framework for the evaluation and
implementation of jurisdictional reforms. As such, we do not summarize here the
conclusions already contained in the empirical analysis, but apply them, together with the
lessons learnt from other contributions, to the definition of a set of lessons or principles
that may assist the formulation of jurisdictional consolidation/fragmentation policies
around the world.

4.2 A set of guiding principles for jurisdictional reform

1.

Clarify the objectives of the jurisdictional reform.

Although it may appear to be a straightforward proposition, any jurisdictional reform
must depart from the definition of clear policy objectives. This is especially important in
light of the implicit trade-offs between some of the policy goals generally considered for
this type of reform. In the past, jurisdictional reforms have been pursued, among other
reasons, to: 1) achieve savings in the average cost of local public service production; 2)
improve the allocative efficiency of government by better matching local preferences
with jurisdictional borders; 3) create new democratic spaces of representation; and 4)
assist economic competition in a globalized world (especially in the case of large
metropolitan centers).

For example, when jurisdictional reforms are initiated in the context of fiscal crisis, the
overarching objective is likely to be the reduction of average costs of service provision.
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This, if it leads to consolidation in order to achieve economies of scale, may be at odds
with alternative objectives such as ensuring political accountability or attending to
heterogeneous preferences. Thus a clear list with the prioritization of objectives can assist
better policy formulation.

However, the traditional policy tradeoffs encountered when approaching jurisdictional
reform may not be insurmountable. In theory, it may be viable to ensure a greater level of
achievement of these independent policy objectives if the policy alternatives considered
are not solely limited to jurisdictional consolidation or fragmentation. Recent
international experiences show that there is an array of institutional mechanisms for local
service delivery that can achieve efficiency gains in the production of public services
without compromising political accountability or the tailoring of public services to local
preferences. The latter will be further discussed below.

2.

Avoid dogmatic and uniform approaches: One size does not fit all.

Jurisdictional reform must start from the assumption that the expected efficiency gains
from consolidation or further fragmentation may not be shared across the territory by all
existing jurisdictions. The analysis of the empirical literature on economies of scale in
public service delivery shows that the population level at which such savings in the
average cost of production is exhausted varies widely by service and by sample of
jurisdictions.
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The pioneering work of Hirsch (1959) unveiled that economies of scale in fire services
were exhausted after a 100,000 population level was reached. In Bodkin & Conklin
(1971) the reduction in the average production costs of police and fire services was
limited to population sizes between 5,000 and 10,000 citizens, whereas for water supply
and public works it extended to population sizes of around 150,000 people. For solid
waste collection, McDavid (2000) determines full economies of scale are reached in
localities with up to 5,000 inhabitants in Canada, while Stevens (1978) optimal
population size for refuse collection in his USA sample is reached at 20,000 people.
Finally, in Spain, Bel (2005) also finds that population sizes of around 20,000 exhaust the
potential economies of scale in waste collection.

Such population limits are even more restrictive in the area of education. As discussed
above, Duncombe et al. (1995) show that only the consolidation of districts with less than
500 students in the state of New York offers potential for the reduction in average costs.
In a similar study, Edelman & Knudsen (1990) in Iowa conclude that economies of scale
are concentrated in student populations between 800 and 900 students. Lastly, in Maine,
the optimal student population size for a school district is estimated by Deller & Rudnicki
(1992) in around 2000 students.

Thus optimal jurisdictional sizes for service delivery may vary by service, and even
within the same service, due to other factors such as geography, may not be identical
across a given national territory. Furthermore, as production and delivery technology
change, it may affect the expected potential for economies of scale dramatically. In such
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a fluid environment, flexible approaches that allow multiple institutional set ups for
service delivery are required to respond to the different characteristics of a country’s
jurisdictions.

3.

Start by clarifying sub-national functional assignments.

In light of the different potential for economies of scale associated with the traditional
local public services, a clear understanding of the sub-national expenditure assignments is
required in order to estimate the net impact of jurisdictional reform on the average cost of
service production. Consolidation for instance would not offer great efficiency gains if
the set of services being delivered by local governments are such (and will remain to be
such) that the optimal jurisdictional sizes for their production are small.

Expenditure assignments may not even be homogeneous across a given country’s
government tiers. Asymmetric assignments, whereby increased expenditure authority is
allocated for a larger number of services to jurisdictions with proven managerial capacity
are common around the world. This adds yet another caveat to the expected gains to be
obtained from consolidation for instance, since the consolidation policy could be
promising (in terms of reductions in average production costs) for just a given sub-set of
sub-national governments and not others of the same tier.
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4.

Examine each case individually under transparent guidelines and identify the

potential for economies of scale.

In light of the significant number of caveats that may affect the achievement of the
objectives defined for jurisdictional reform (either consolidation or fragmentation),
individual attention to each case is important to establish whether such objectives are
likely to be achieved. Clear national (or sub-national, if regions for instance are tasked
with deciding on this issue) guidelines and criteria, both quantitative and qualitative,
should be made available to jurisdictions considering altering their territorial limits.

In particular, the evaluation process must aim to offer substantive information and
analysis to the citizenry as to what can be expected from the consolidation (or division)
process. For example, details of the expected savings (or improvements in the quality) of
the provision of services could help curb opposition to consolidation. Over the last couple
of decades, the methodological analysis of economies of scale has improved
considerably. From the modeling of production costs using translog functions to the use
of data envelopment analysis (DEA) to explore relative productive efficiency, advances
in the analysis of economies of scale allow estimating their potential within reasonable
margins. These and other methodologies can provide extremely useful information as to
whether the desired gains in cost savings from jurisdictional reform are truly available
and should become “due diligence” analytical requirements.
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5.

Preferences for political accountability lead to smaller jurisdictional sizes and

reforms must adequately incorporate this aspect.

Even in situations where relatively homogeneous preferences exist, together with certain
potential for economies of scale, consolidation may be hindered by citizen’s preferences
to remain close to their local representatives. The inertia of existing institutional
arrangements and the identity associated with them cannot be underestimated when
considering jurisdictional reforms.

Our empirical analysis of jurisdictional fragmentation patterns across countries has
controlled for the best available indicators of heterogeneous preferences and still finds
that preferences for political accountability affect very importantly the results. Given the
presence of such preferences, one expects to find average jurisdictional sizes below what
the mere analysis of economies of scale and heterogeneous preferences would indicate.

Thus, citizen’s resistance to consolidation in a given jurisdiction may also be the exercise
of a preference for proximity to their local representatives, an important variable to be
added to the economic analysis of optimal jurisdictional size. Acknowledging that
preferences across jurisdictions may often be quite homogeneous, and that economies of
scale may exist to a certain scale if consolidation ensued, citizens may still be willing to
pay a higher price for services (in the form of taxes) for the geographical proximity to
their representatives. In such situations, alternative avenues for service delivery that
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allow reaching economies of scale while respecting current fragmentation levels will be
required.

6.

Existing institutions and regulations can jeopardize reaching efficiency gains in

the short to medium term.

The expected administrative savings from jurisdictional consolidation may be
compromised from the start. Regulations in public sector employment (or the power of
public sector unions) for instance may lead to upward equalization of local public salaries
in the event of consolidation, increasing administrative costs. Also, restrictions to
retrenchment in public sector employment may limit short term efficiency gains in this
area.

The relative importance of these aspects will vary importantly from one country to
another depending on the regulatory framework for public sector employment. If, for
instance, a large percentage of employees in sub-national administrations are under fixed
term contracts, it may be easier to adapt to the expectedly lower human resources
requirements of a consolidated administration. In the long run, all factors of production
could be altered, but such analysis must be incorporated in the estimation of the cost
savings (increases) expected from consolidation (fragmentation).
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7.

Intermediate levels of government may pose a limit to local consolidation.

The existence of intermediate tiers of government with subsidiary responsibility over the
delivery of services that local governments cannot provide due to their limited capacity
may take away incentives to jurisdictional mergers.

The scenario is relatively common in several countries around the world: small municipal
governments unable to meet their expenditure assignments that relinquish the provision
of certain services to the immediately higher tier. From a political economy perspective,
these situation contributes to justify the role of the intermediate levels of government,
while diminishes the incentives for municipal mergers. Our empirical analysis has shown
this variable to be a highly significant determinant of current levels of fragmentation, thus
lending support to a generalization of this result for a large sample of countries. On the
other hand, the existence of intermediate levels of government may be perfectly justified
because of the size of the country and the externalities across local jurisdictions in the
provision of certain public services.

8.

Multi-layered institutional frameworks may allow for efficiency gains without

loss of political representation.

The international experience shows that, around the world, new institutional set ups for
public service delivery may be allowing jurisdictions to reach economies of scale without
the need for changes to jurisdictional sizes. The experience of special districts, inter-
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municipal cooperation, or even home owners associations may offer alternatives to
exploiting economies of scale where they exist.

A scenario where a local government delivers some services directly, contracts out others
and cooperates yet with other local governments in the joint delivery of some will
increasingly become the rule and not the exception across the world. Thus, a country’s
legal framework should allow local governments to opt, case by case, for the institutional
structure more adequate to their characteristics and needs.

The realization that not all services offer similar potential for economies of scale, added
to strong citizen’s preference for political accountability, should lead policy makers to
depart from the traditional policy choice between consolidation and fragmentation, and
include new alternatives for service delivery. In Table 4.1 we discuss the main
advantages and disadvantages of three of these alternatives; direct service provision,
privatization and inter-jurisdictional cooperation.

In summary, the economies of scale pursued with consolidation can be reached through
alternative avenues (Warner, 2006). Privatization and cooperation both allow additionally
maintaining identical levels of government representation, as they focus on the provision
of those services with potential for cost savings. On the other hand, both privatization and
cooperation may incorporate high transaction costs into the production of services. The
definition of contracts either among different jurisdictions or with private companies is an
imperfect process that takes away control from the local administrations. However, as
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they are contracts, they can be regularly re-negotiated or re-designed, a less plausible
option in the case of consolidation. In any case, as experience in contracting accumulates
and trust is built among the jurisdictions and with their private contractors, these
transaction costs are likely to diminish over time.
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Table 11. Institutional Options for Service Delivery: A comparison
Advantages

Disadvantages

Economies
of Scale

Economies
of Scope

Political
Accountability

Private Sector
Development

Transaction
Costs

Regulatory
Costs

Loss of Political
Accountability

Direct
Provision via
Consolidation

Available
depending
on the
service and
the size of
the market.

Available
potentially as
it allows
managing a
larger
number of
services with
a lower
resource
endowment.

Fully retained

Does not contribute
to local private
sector development.

Should not
increase.

Should not
increase.

Loss of
institutional
representativeness.
Greater distance
between local
government and
its citizens.

Privatization

Available
depending
on the
service and
the size of
the market.

Available
potentially as
it allows
concentrating
resources in
other public
services.

Allows
maintaining
level of
political
representation
but loss of
control over
service
delivery.

Potentially
contributes to the
development of the
local prívate sector
if used as
suppliers/producers.

High initial
contractual
transaction
costs.
Diminish in
the long run.

High,
especially in
production
process that
are highly
technological
in nature.

Potential loss of
control over
production and
quality levels.
High political
costs if prices
increase without
control.

Interjurisdictional
Cooperation

Available
depending
on the
service and
the size of
the market.

Available
potentially
depending on
the
production
method
selected for
the service.

Allows
maintaining an
almost
identical level
of institutional
representation.

Potentially
contributes to the
development of the
local prívate sector
if used as
suppliers/producers.

Potentially
high,
diminish in
the long run
as
experience
and trust
builds.

None, unless
cooperation
leads to subcontracting
to prívate
sector.

Minimal, and
recoverable if
agreements expire
or are cancelled.

Source: Martinez Vazquez y Gomez (2008)
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The formation of special districts, a mostly U.S. and French phenomenon, provides and
alternative to inter-jurisdictional cooperation, where jurisdictions create a new
institutional body to manage and finance a particular local service. This model may be
considered as a last stage in the evolution of inter-jurisdictional cooperation, where such
arrangements are institutionalized to the point of creating a truly new government unit.

The share of services being provided by any of these institutional mechanisms is
expected to vary over time. As Warner (2006) argues, the share of services jointly
provided via cooperation in the USA has been diminishing, especially in rural area over
the last two decades, due to structural factors related to the ability of rural localities to
compete in an increasingly market based governmental system. It is expected that similar
forces will be at play at different stages in countries around the world, leading us to
multiple equilibria in overall sub-national government strauctures.

9.

Consolidation should be incentivized, not forced.

There is little rationale for forced jurisdictional consolidation unless it reaches some of
the goals defined above. If the potential to achieve those goals exists, then policy should
facilitate the voluntary agreement of local governments to merge. Political opposition
from the electorate may jeopardize the success of the experience to the point of making it
fail.
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If the efficiency gains can reasonably be achieved via other service delivery mechanisms,
then consolidation should be suggested as a voluntary option and incentivized from the
higher government tiers if considered an adequate policy path. Forced consolidation may
encounter such a popular opposition that may in fact compromise the efficiency gains
expected from the process. As with other incentives schemes, the net positive benefits
expected from the process of consolidation should be independent from the incentives
provided. If only fiscal incentives make consolidation attractive, as they are likely to
expire over time, they may not lead to substantive reform. Additional grants to assist the
building-up of the administrative capacity of the jurisdictions merging, or for the
construction of transport and communications infrastructure that better integrate the
merging jurisdictions, are reasonable incentives to offer. However, the sole provision of
short to medium term fiscal incentives, devoid of solid, long-lasting efficiency gains from
jurisdictional consolidation in the form of economies of scale or others, is a policy likely
doomed to fail.

10.

Widespread advocacy on the benefits of consolidation is required.

Linked to the earlier point, voluntary consolidation, where it needs a referendum passing
the new jurisdictional structure, requires intense and widespread advocacy to
communicate to the population the benefits expected from the measure. If the cost
savings expected and the improvement in service delivery are not obvious to the citizens,
the policy will not be understood or supported. Consolidation is a policy that constantly
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must be linked to the long term national development plans. Otherwise it may be
perceived as a political game detached from the preoccupations of the common citizen.

4.3 Conclusions

The relatively low attention that such an important topic as the vertical structure of
government has received in the public finance literature is somewhat surprising. The
theoretical and empirical work developed in this dissertation is an attempt to contribute to
advance our knowledge in this critical area for public sector performance.

A first general conclusion drawn from our analysis is that the optimal level of
jurisdictional fragmentation seems to be in permanent evolution across countries
depending on the available technology for public services production, on the citizen’s
preferences for political accountability, and on how the socio-economic, ethno-linguistic
and geographical conditions of a given country affect the heterogeneity of local
preferences for public goods and services.

In light of such fluidity in the optimal level of government fragmentation, it is advisable
not to assume that “cookie cutter” policies will render homogenous and solid results. In
particular, jurisdictional consolidation processes around the world have been regularly
advocated without an adequate analysis of their potential benefits. We have argued in this
dissertation that there is a need to avoid dogmatism in jurisdictional reform policy and
opt instead for a flexible array of policy options that may allow reaching in theory
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Private contracting, inter-jurisdictional cooperation, or the creation of special districts
offer institutional mechanisms for service delivery that may allow reaching economies of
scale (when they exist) without compromising local citizen’s preferences for political
accountability. It is becoming the norm, and not the exception, that local governments
will deliver directly some services, privatize others, and cooperate with other
jurisdictions in the joint production of the rest. Again, the share of services provided
under each institutional alternative is likely (and has been shown) to vary depending on
ideological preferences of the local representatives, changes to production technologies,
or structural factors that reduce the ability of certain localities to cooperate and lead them
back to direct provision (Warner, 2006).

This does not necessarily mean that all vertical structures of government are adequate.
High jurisdictional fragmentation may present enormous challenges to efficient service
delivery if it is coupled with low managerial capacity, weak tax bases, and inefficient
political accountability processes. If the benefits from consolidation overwhelm those
that could arguably be obtained from alternative policies, strong advocacy on those
expected results should be undertaken, together with voluntary consolidation programs
that are adequately incentivized. Equally, the process of new jurisdiction formation
should be designed including both quantitative and qualitative minimum requirements in
scale of production, fiscal sustainability, political accountability and administrative
capacity.
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